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LAND USE AND HOUSING POLICIES TO REDUCE 
CONCENTRATED POVERTY  
AND RACIAL SEGREGATION 
Myron Orfield*
INTRODUCTION 
As metropolitan areas spread over huge stretches of land, residents 
living at the core, particularly poor Blacks and Latinos, become 
increasingly isolated from the jobs and other life opportunities that  are 
rapidly dispersing among increasingly far-flung suburbs.  The 
concentration of existing affordable housing in central cities1 and older 
suburbs perpetuates the isolation of low-income residents and people of 
color from life opportunities available to suburban residents.2  One result is 
to reinforce the racial segregration which is intimately related to the 
concentration of poverty at the urban core and in older, inner-ring suburbs.3
Urban sprawl tends to exacerbate residential racial segregation4 because 
unchecked development at the fringe permits rapid abandonment of inner-
suburban and central-city housing stocks as White residents move into 
expanding suburban developments.  The resulting isolation of non-Whites 
* Associate Professor of Law and Fesler-Lampert Chair in Urban and Regional Affairs, 
University of Minnesota.  Professor Orfield is Executive Director of the Institute on Race 
and Poverty at the University of Minnesota, and a non-resident senior fellow at the 
Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.  The author thanks Daria Roithmayr, Ann 
Burkhart, Brad Karkkainen, Guy Charles, C. Ann Olson for her editorial help and 
substantive comments, and Scott Crain for his research assistance. 
 1. MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY 46 
(2002) [hereinafter ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS]. 
 2. Id. at 122-23; John A. Powell, Opportunity-Based Housing, 12 J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 188, 193-94 (2003) [hereinafter Powell, Opportunity-
Based Housing]. 
 3. ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 1, at 49-53; John A. Powell, 
Achieving Racial Justice: What’s Sprawl Got to Do With It?, POVERTY & RACE RES. ACTION 
COUNCIL NEWSL. (Poverty & Race Research Action Council, Wash., D.C.), Sept./Oct. 1999, 
at 1. 
 4. See, e.g., ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 1, at 131 (“[M]any 
regions become even more fragmented with growth and expansion into new communities.”). 
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in the increasingly segregated areas that Whites abandon effectively denies 
many of those residents access to the sites of opportunity in distant, 
developing areas of the region.5  This isolation is perpetuated not only by 
the concentration of existing affordable housing in central cities and older 
suburbs, but by the barriers to developing affordable housing in most 
outlying suburbs.  One of the most invidious barriers is exclusionary 
zoning. 
Governmental fragmentation—the proliferation of separate political 
jurisdictions—facilitates structures such as exclusionary zoning laws.6  By 
prohibiting the development of housing that only the better-off can afford, 
these local policies effectively exclude the poor and people of color from 
the places that erect those policy fences.  Together with fragmented school 
districts that institutionalize the racial segregation of students, practices 
such as exclusionary zoning unnecessarily burden both the affected 
individuals and metropolitan regions.7
The harmful effects of sprawl and fragmentation on people of color have 
been well documented.  Racial segregation concentrates poverty, with or 
without class segregation, which Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton have 
demonstrated with their extensive research.8  Massey and Denton explain 
that “racial segregation—and its characteristic institutional form, the Black 
ghetto—are the key structural factors responsible for the perpetuation of 
Black poverty in the United States.”9
Together with overt racial discrimination, as where realtors steer Blacks 
and Whites into segregated neighborhoods,10 the structural racism that 
restricts affordable housing to ghettoized areas of the urban core intensifies 
racial segregation and perpetuates poverty.  To address both overt and 
structural racism requires undoing segregation and making it possible for 
people to live in places where they can access opportunities for jobs, 
quality schools, and social networks.  Making affordable housing available 
throughout a metro region, rather than in segregated places distant from 
opportunity, is a significant means to address segregation and concentrated 
poverty. 
In recent years, scholarship about potential reform has been increasingly 
 5. For a comprehensive review of the dynamics and consequences of racial residential 
segregation, see Camille Z. Charles, The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation, 29 
ANN. REV. SOC. 167 (2003). 
 6. Powell, Opportunity-Based Housing, supra note 2, at 193-94. 
 7. Id. at 194-95. 
 8. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION 
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 118-25 (1993). 
 9. Id. at 9. 
 10. See infra note 14 and accompanying text. 
FORDHAMPP2 5/1/2006  2:15:50 PM 
2006] REDUCING CONCENTRATED POVERTY 103 
 
pessimistic, citing enduring local sovereignty over land use as a barrier to 
regional cooperation, regional planning, regional housing, and regional tax-
based sharing.11  In response, this article reviews housing and land use 
policies that several states have enacted to increase the availability of 
affordable housing in metropolitan regions by countering sprawl and the 
effects of governmental fragmentation.  It illustrates these approaches with 
case examples of the most promising approaches thus far attempted in the 
nation’s metropolitan regions, and summarizes the empirical and analytic 
research evaluating the effectiveness of these policies.  The success of such 
policies is measured largely by the extent to which they increase the stock 
of affordable housing available to non-White and poor residents, and by 
their potential to reduce residential racial segregation.  The examples 
presented are the most hopeful illustrations of approaches that states and 
metropolitan regions can adopt to counter the inequitable effects of sprawl 
and fragmentation. 
This article recommends that land use and housing policies be marshaled 
to reduce residential racial segregation and concentrated poverty.  Such 
policies should be statewide, or at least regional, in scope.  Isolated policies 
will encourage leap-frog development that in turn will promote both sprawl 
and racial segregation.12
Secondly, state legislatures must adopt a coordinated policy approach. 
This article uses Oregon’s comprehensive land use legislation as a 
paradigmatic example of policies that effectively promote affordable 
housing and decrease urban sprawl.  Other regional government policies 
that promote integration and reduce sprawl also serve as useful models. 
The nine policies that I believe are necessary to promote stable 
metropolitan living patterns are discussed in Part VI of this article. 
With the adoption of a regional approach to governance of development 
and the nine policies laid out below, metropolitan regions can work to 
reduce sprawl and promote integrated communities. This Article addresses 
the seriousness of segregation and the dire consequences it has on both 
poor minorities and the middle-class Whites who are separated from people 
of color.  It then analyzes Oregon’s legislative scheme to promote 
 11. See, e.g., HAL WOLMAN ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE CALCULUS OF COALITIONS: 
CITIES AND STATES AND THE METROPOLITAN AGENDA (2004), available at 
https://www.brook.edu/urban/pubs/20040422_coalitions.pdf; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
GOVERNANCE AND OPPORTUNITY IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA (Alan Altshuler et al. eds., 
1999). 
 12. James A. Kushner, Smart Growth, New Urbanism and Diversity: Progressive 
Planning Movements in America and Their Impact on Poor and Minority Ethnic 
Populations, 21 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 45, 53 (2003) (citing Loudoun County, 
Virginia as an example of an isolated effort that may propel leapfrogging). 
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affordable housing and manage urban growth.  Part III discusses the 
necessity of inclusionary housing policies to promote mixed-income 
developments, while Part IV examines the benefit of dispersed subsidized 
housing in the context of the Twin Cities’ progressive siting policies of the 
1970s and the Area Wide Housing Program.  Finally, Part V discusses 
positive integration measures, and Part VI sets forth the nine policy 
recommendations noted above in detail. 
I.  THE PROBLEM OF SEGREGATION 
Housing discrimination contributes to the racial segregation of the 
poor.13  Even today, real estate agents discriminate against middle- and 
low-income minorities by showing them a segregated subset of the market, 
while at the same time steering Whites away from communities with 
people of color.14  Discrimination against minorities also abounds in 
mortgage lending.15
Discrimination and segregation are not confined to the inner-city; 
instead, they affect large parts of suburbia.  For example, a recent study of 
metropolitan Boston showed that nearly half of Black homebuyers were 
concentrated in only seven of 126 communities.16
The way in which government agencies have located public housing 
projects is also a particularly important cause of segregation.17  Since the 
 13. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 8, at 102-09 (citing the Housing Discrimination 
Study conducted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development). 
 14. See generally  MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL., URBAN INST., DISCRIMINATION IN 
METROPOLITAN HOUSING MARKETS: NATIONAL RESULTS FROM PHASE I HDS 2000 (2002), 
available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/Phase1_Report.pdf; JOHN YINGER, 
CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST: THE CONTINUING COSTS OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 
51-61 (1995) [hereinafter YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST]; George C. 
Galster, Racial Steering in Urban Housing Markets: A Review of Audit Evidence, 18 REV. 
BLACK POL. ECON. 105 passim (1990). 
 15. See YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST, supra note 14, at 69-70 
(analyzing HMDA data and finding stark racial differences in lending policy, even 
controlling for differences in lender policy and individual economic characteristics of the 
borrower); John Yinger, Cash in Your Face: The Cost of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination 
in Housing, 42 J. URB. ECON. 339, 351 (1997) (“[M]inority applicants are more likely than 
comparable white applicants to be turned down for a mortgage.”).
 16. GUY STUART,  THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., SEGREGATION IN THE 
BOSTON METROPOLITAN AREA AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY 5 (2000), available at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/metro/housing_boston.pdf.
 17. See Robert Gray & Steven Tursky, Location and Racial/Ethnic Occupancy for 
HUD-Subsidized Family Housing in Ten Metropolitan Areas, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION 
AND FEDERAL POLICY 235, 249-50 (John M. Goering ed., 1986) (finding that HUD-
subsidized rental housing was “concentrated in a relatively small number of minority-
occupied census tracts”); Florence W. Roisman, Intentional Racial Discrimination and 
Segregation by the Federal Government as a Principal Cause of Concentrated Poverty: A 
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1930s, housing authorities concentrated public housing sites in inner cities 
and, since 1969, filled them with poor tenants rather than encouraging 
mixed-income, racially-stable communities.18  Some commentators have 
theorized that if the federal government had not segregated public housing 
or the tenants of public housing, mandatory busing to desegregate public 
schools in the 1960s and 1970s would not have been necessary.19
These forces of segregation and larger patterns of governmental 
fragmentation20 limit most of the Black and Latino middle classes, along 
with poor minorities, to living in areas with increasing poverty and 
diminishing opportunity.  In 2000, about half of both the Black and Latino 
middle classes had suburbanized in the one hundred largest regions.21  
Because of housing discrimination, however, Blacks and Latinos who left 
the city often ended up in at-risk, segregated communities characterized by 
older housing stock, slow growth, and low tax bases—the resources that 
support public services and schools.22  Residents in these at-risk segregated 
communities have high poverty rates and high concentrations of minority 
students in the schools.23  These realities decrease opportunities for middle 
class minorities as compared with their White counterparts in education, 
wealth acquisition in home equity, and employment.24
Response to Schill and Wachter, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1351, 1367-69 (1995); Michael H. 
Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy: 
Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1290 (1995).  
 18. See Schill & Wachter, supra note 17, at 1293-95. 
 19. See, e.g., Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on 
Metropolitan Society, 80 MINN. L. REV. 825, 854 (1996). 
 20. The Northeast and Midwest developed highly fragmented governmental structures 
with hundreds of municipalities, and the structure that initially developed was largely 
dependent upon property taxes.  ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 1, at 130-
33 (noting areas of fragmentation by numbers of local governments per 100,000 residents). 
 21. See MYRON ORFIELD & TOM LUCE, INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, MINORITY 
SUBURBANIZATION AND RACIAL CHANGE: STABLE INTEGRATION, NEIGHBORHOOD 
TRANSITION, AND THE NEED FOR REGIONAL APPROACHES 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.irpumn.org/uls/resources/projects/MinoritySubn_050605wMAPS.pdf (“In the 
nation’s 102 largest metropolitan regions, nearly half of the nonwhite population now lives 
in suburbs.”). 
 22. See ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 1, at 37-38.  Forty percent of 
metropolitan residents live in at-risk suburbs.  Id. at 2. 
 23. Id. at 37. 
 24. In Chicago and Atlanta, for instance, the black middle class moved south to socially 
and fiscally limited suburbs, while jobs and economic opportunity moved north.  Id. at 14.  
Additionally, the black middle class in Washington D.C. is moving southeast of the city to 
Prince George’s County, one of the poorest suburban counties in the nation, while job 
opportunities move west toward Dulles Airport and beyond.  SHERYLL CASHIN, THE 
FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN 
DREAM 136 (2004); see generally MYRON ORFIELD, METRO. AREA RESEARCH CORP., 
WASHINGTON METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY 
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Because of their concentration in distressed, racially segregated cities 
and inner suburbs, the majority of poor Blacks and Latinos live in poor 
neighborhoods and attend poor schools; at the same time, poor Whites 
more often than not live in middle-income neighborhoods and attend 
middle-class schools.25  Children who grow up in densely poor 
neighborhoods and attend low-income schools face many barriers to 
academic and occupational achievement.  Studies show they are more 
likely than children in mixed-income schools and communities to drop out 
of high school or become pregnant as teenagers.26  Long-term social 
isolation, caused by racial discrimination, also leads to the formation of 
gangs and other “oppositional social identit[ies]” in deprived communities 
that are held out of the mainstream of opportunity.27  In addition, racial and 
social isolation leads to linguistic isolation, which limits employment 
opportunities for poor minorities.28  Neighborhoods with concentrated 
poverty have very high crime rates, often many times higher than suburban 
violent crime rates, and huge health disparities resulting from the 
concentration of environmental hazards, stress, inadequate health care 
(1999), available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/myron.pdf. 
 25. While there are some very high-poverty White neighborhoods in Appalachia and in 
some older Rust Belt cities, more than seventy-five percent of poor Whites in the United 
States live outside of high-poverty neighborhoods.  See PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND 
PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND THE AMERICAN CITY 61-62 (1997).  On the other hand, 
approximately eighty-two percent of poor Blacks and Latinos live in neighborhoods of high 
poverty.  Id. at 62. 
 26. See Jonathan Crane, Effects of Neighborhoods on Dropping Out of School and 
Teenage Childbearing, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 299, 299-319 (Christopher Jenks & Paul 
E. Peterson eds., 1991).  Dropout rates of fifty percent or greater are thirty times more 
common among majority-minority schools.  See ROBERT BALFANZ & NETTIE LEGTERS, CTR. 
FOR SOC. ORG. OF SCHS., JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., LOCATING THE DROPOUT CRISIS 5 (2004), 
available at http://www.csos.jhu.edu/tdhs/rsch/Locating_Dropouts.pdf (“29% of the 
nation’s majority minority high schools . . . have senior classes with 50% fewer seniors than 
freshmen.”); see also CHRISTOPHER B. SWANSON, URBAN INST., WHO GRADUATES? WHO 
DOESN’T? A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION, CLASS OF 2001 
27-28 (2004), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410934_WhoGraduates.pdf 
(noting that graduation rates are lower in majority-minority districts, as compared to 
majority-White districts); GARY ORFIELD ET AL., LOSING OUR FUTURE: HOW MINORITY 
YOUTH ARE BEING LEFT BEHIND BY THE GRADUATION RATE CRISIS 6 (2004), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410936_LosingOurFuture.pdf (“[W]hether a student 
attends a school district with a high concentration of minority students and has little 
exposure to white students in school is also a strong predictor of failing to graduate.”). 
 27. Signithia Fordham, Racelessness as a Factor in Black Students’ School Success: 
Pragmatic Strategy or Pyrrhic Victory?, 58 HARV. EDUC. REV. 54, 56 (1988). 
 28. See Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn M. Neckerman, “We’d Love to Hire Them, But  
. .  .” : The Meaning of Race for Employers, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 203, 216 
(Christopher Jenks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (reporting that employers view job 
seekers negatively if they cannot communicate in standard English). 
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facilities, and poor quality food.29  The increased need for services, the lack 
of role models and social connections to higher education and employment, 
oppositional cultures, and other problems of poverty make it even more 
difficult for teachers to do their jobs in public schools.30
All individuals—including poor people of color—benefit from living in 
affluent and opportunity-rich neighborhoods with large tax bases and 
abundant entry-level jobs.  Integration has long-term benefits for people of 
all races.  Blacks, Latinos, and Whites from desegregated elementary 
schools are more likely than their counterparts from segregated schools to 
attend a desegregated college, live in a desegregated neighborhood, work in 
a desegregated environment, and have high career aspirations.31  The vast 
majority of law students attending some of the nation’s most selective law 
schools report attending desegregated colleges.32  Moreover, diverse 
educational settings contribute to students’ ability to participate in a 
pluralistic society.33
II.  COORDINATED LEGISLATION TO MANAGE URBAN GROWTH AND  
FOSTER AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
Oregon provides an example of a coordinated, statewide legislative 
approach to restraining sprawl and providing affordable housing 
throughout a region.  Among other things, Oregon’s legislation requires 
local governments to create comprehensive plans; prohibits exclusionary 
zoning; requires growth boundaries in urban regions; and provides for 
 29. ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 1, at 54. 
 30. See Gary Orfield, Urban Schooling and the Perpetuation of Job Inequality in 
Metropolitan Chicago, in URBAN LABOR MARKETS AND JOB OPPORTUNITY 161, 162-72 
(George E. Peterson & Wayne Vroman eds., 1992). 
 31. See JOMILLS H. BRADDOCK II & JAMES M. MCPARTLAND, CTR. FOR SOC. ORG. OF 
SCHOOLS, MORE EVIDENCE ON SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES THAT PERPETUATE 
MINORITY SEGREGATION: THE RELATIONSHIP OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
DESEGREGATION 3 (1983) (describing the results of a retrospective study that found that 
blacks who attended desegregated schools had more confidence and more consideration for 
jobs not traditionally held by blacks, and that both blacks and whites who attended 
desegregated schools were, as adults, more likely to live in desegregated neighborhoods); 
see also Amy Stuart Wells & Robert Crain, Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term Effects 
of School  Desegregation, 64 REV. OF EDUC. RES. 531, 552 (1994) (“[D]esegregated black 
students are more likely to have desegregated social and professional networks . . . more 
likely to find themselves in desegregated employment, and . . . more likely to be working in 
white-collar and professional jobs.”). 
 32. Gary Orfield & Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education: Student Experiences 
in Leading Law Schools, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 143, 152-53 (Gary Orfield ed., 2001). 
 33. See, e.g., id. at 159-66 (discussing the perceived benefits of attending a desegregated 
law school). 
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oversight and prompt, effective enforcement of land-use actions. 
A. Land Use Coordination and Oversight: Oregon’s Comprehensive 
Legislation 
For over thirty years, Oregon has had the most comprehensive and 
progressive land use management legislation in the country.  Passed in 
1973, the Land Conservation and Development Act (LCDA) provided for 
“the highest possible level of liveability in Oregon” by requiring 
“coordinated comprehensive plans for cities and counties, regional areas 
and the state as a whole.”34
To implement the LCDA, the Oregon legislature created the Land 
Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC), a seven-member 
policy-making body appointed by the governor.35  LCDC is empowered to 
adopt by rule or by goal “any statewide land use policies that it considers 
necessary” to carry out the LCDA, to review local government 
comprehensive plans for compliance with LCDC goals and rules, and to 
coordinate the planning efforts of state agencies to assure compliance with 
the goals.36  The LCDC appoints the director of the Department of Land 
Conservation and Development, which serves as LCDC’s staff.37
To provide for expeditious enforcement in matters involving land use, 
the LCDA created the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), a three-
member board appointed by the governor to hear appeals of land use 
decisions by local governments, special districts, and state agencies.38  The 
enforcement powers given to LUBA and the Department are discussed in 
more detail below, following an overview of the LCDA’s comprehensive 
planning requirement. 
1. Comprehensive Planning 
Each city and county in Oregon must prepare and adopt a 
comprehensive plan in compliance with the LCDC goals, and must enact 
land use regulations to implement its comprehensive plans.39  Once LCDC 
has acknowledged a local government’s plan and regulations, the local 
 34. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.010(1) (2005). 
 35. § 197.030(1). 
 36. § 197.040(1)(c)(A). 
 37. §§ 197.075-.090.  The legislation also established a Joint Legislative Committee on 
Land Use pursuant to section 197.125, and an advisory committees of citizens and local 
officials, appointed by LCDC, pursuant to sections 197.160-.165. 
 38. §§ 197.810-.855. 
 39. Any amendments or revisions of comprehensive plans or regulations must also 
comply with the goals.  § 197.175(2)(a). 
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government must make land use decisions in compliance with its plan and 
regulations.40  State agencies also are required to carry out their land use 
planning and activities in compliance with the goals set by LCDC, and in a 
manner compatible with local governments’ acknowledged comprehensive 
plans and regulations.41
In the Portland metropolitan region, there is, in addition, a “metropolitan 
service district.”  Metro, as it is known, is an elected regional government 
approved in 1978 by voters in Multnomah, Washington, and Clackamas 
counties.42  As required by the 1992 Metro Charter, Metro created a 
Regional Framework Plan adopted in 199743 that, while not considered a 
comprehensive plan, is subject to review by LCDC.44  In addition, it 
adopted an urban growth boundary in compliance with LCDC’s Goal 14 
(Urbanization)45 as required of all districts.46
Proposed amendments to acknowledged comprehensive plans and land 
use regulations implicating the LCDC goals can be made only if local 
governments give notice to the Department of Land Conservation and 
Development.  Participants in the local government proceeding may appeal 
an amendment, as may the Department, if it is not given notice.47
All “limited land use decisions” that a local government makes must be 
consistent with its comprehensive plan and regulations.48  A “limited land 
use decision” is a decision pertaining to a site within an urban growth 
 40. § 197.175(1).  LCDC had acknowledged all local government comprehensive plans 
as of the end of 1986.  See 1000 Friends of Oregon, An Overview of the History and 
Structure of Oregon’s Land Use Planning Program, 
http://www.friends.org/resources/overview.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2006).  Once 
acknowledged, comprehensive plans are subject to periodic review by LCDC every five to 
ten years (for counties with population of 50,000 or more or cities or metropolitan service 
districts with population of 25,000 or more), or every five to fifteen years (for smaller cities 
and counties).  See §§ 197.628-.629. 
 41. §§ 197.180(1). 
 42. See, e.g., Metro, Land Use Planning, About Metro, http://www.metro-
region.org/pssp.cfm?ProgServID=62 (last visited Feb. 12, 2006) (“Metro is the directly 
elected regional government that serves more than 1.3 million residents in Clackamas, 
Multnomah and Washington counties, and the 25 cities in the Portland, Oregon, 
metropolitan area.”). 
 43. See Metro, Regional Framework Plan, http://www.metro-
region.org/article.cfm?articleid=432 (last visited Feb. 13, 2006) (describing the Regional 
Framework Plan). 
 44. § 197.015 (defining the Metro regional framework plan). 
 45. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-015-0000 (2005) (citing urbanization as the fourteenth statewide 
planning goal). 
 46. § 268.390.  For a discussion of Goal 14 and the region’s urban growth boundary, see 
infra Part II.C. 
 47. §§ 197.610-.620. 
 48. § 197.195(1). 
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boundary (UGB) that involves the approval or denial of a subdivision or 
partition, or the approval or denial of an application based on discretionary 
standards regulating the physical characteristics of a land use.49  Limited 
land use decisions also may be appealed to LUBA.50
2. Dedicated Oversight and Enforcement 
The appeal process is an important part of the LCDA’s effectiveness, 
and two features are significant.  First, LUBA has exclusive jurisdiction to 
review all land use decisions and limited land use decisions for which 
review authority has not been granted to LCDC or the Department of Land 
Conservation and Development.51  Second, appeals to LUBA are handled 
in an expedited manner. 
Any person who participated orally or in writing in the proceedings of 
the local government, special district, or state agency may petition LUBA 
for review of a land use decision by filing a notice of intent to appeal.52  
Such notice must be filed with LUBA within twenty-one days after the land 
use decision became final, or within twenty-one days after the person 
received notice of a decision made without a hearing.53  Within twenty-one 
days of service of the notice of intent to appeal, the local government, 
special district, or agency must transmit to LUBA a copy of the entire 
record of the proceeding under review.54  LUBA may receive briefs and 
hear oral argument according to deadlines it sets, but it must issue a final 
order within seventy-seven days of transmittal of the record. 55
In addition to providing for appeals to LUBA, the LCDA sets out 
judicially reviewable enforcement order procedures.  A person who 
believes that a local government’s comprehensive plan, land use regulation, 
limited land use decision, or other land use decision is not in compliance 
with LCDC’s goals, or with acknowledged comprehensive plan provisions 
or regulations, may request adoption of an enforcement order by the local 
government.56  The local government must issue a written response to that 
request within sixty days of the postmark date.57  If the requester is not 
satisfied with the local government’s response, he or she may present a 
 49. § 197.015. 
 50. § 197.825. 
 51. Id. 
 52. § 197.830. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. § 197.320(6). 
 57. § 197.319(2)(a). 
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petition for an enforcement order to LCDC.58  LCDC may also initiate 
proceedings for an enforcement order on its own motion.59
Either LCDC itself or a hearing officer appointed by LCDC must hold a 
hearing within forty-five days of the petition or motion for an enforcement 
order; LCDC must adopt a final order no later than 120 days after the 
petition was filed.60  If LCDC finds that the local government is not in 
compliance with either the goals or its own acknowledged plan or 
regulations, it will issue an order requiring the government to take action to 
bring itself into compliance.61  As part of the enforcement order, LCDC 
may withhold state planning grant money from the local government until 
the government complies with the order.62
LCDC enforcement orders are subject to judicial review by the Oregon 
Court of Appeals.63  The court may reverse, modify, or remand the order 
only if it finds the order to be unlawful in substance or procedure, 
unconstitutional, invalid because it exceeds LCDC’s statutory authority, or 
not supported by substantial evidence in the record.64  Oregon courts have 
recognized and deferred to the broad authority that the legislature gave 
LCDC.65
Lane County v. Land Conservation & Development Commission66 
presents an example of judicial deference to LCDC decisions.67  In Lane 
County, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld an LCDC amendment to Goal 3 
(Agricultural Lands)68 and the Goal’s implementing regulations.69  Lane 
County argued that the amended goal conflicted with state statutes by 
imposing restrictions on statutorily permitted uses of high-value 
farmlands.70  But the court held that LCDC did not exceed the scope of its 
authority in “promulgat[ing] regulations imposing additional restrictions on 
land classified as high value farmland, even if those regulations have the 
effect of prohibiting uses otherwise permissible under the applicable 
 58. § 197.319(2)(c). 
 59. § 197.324(1). 
 60. § 197.328. 
 61. § 197.320. 
 62. § 197.335(4). 
 63. § 197.335(2). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (providing an example of such 
deference). 
 66. 942 P.2d 278 (Or. 1997). 
 67. Id. at 285. 
 68. Id. at 284; see also OR. ADMIN. R. 660-015-0000 (2005). 
 69. Lane County, 942 P.2d at 284-85. 
 70. Id. at 282. 
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statute.”71
The planning requirement and the prompt review mechanisms are 
significant foundations of Oregon’s comprehensive approach.  In addition, 
Oregon’s coordinated approach includes three features that are significant 
policy tools for reducing sprawl, enhancing the availability of affordable 
housing throughout a region, and connecting all residents with a region’s 
opportunities.  These tools, discussed next, include prohibiting 
exclusionary zoning; requiring metropolitan areas to set urban growth 
boundaries; and linking development and public transportation. 
B. Prohibit Exclusionary Zoning 
The first step toward providing affordable housing throughout a region is 
to eliminate policies that preclude development of affordable housing.  The 
most common legal impediment to affordable housing is exclusionary 
zoning.  Exclusionary zoning limits residential development to detached 
single-family homes on large lots, and is common in suburbs.72  When the 
only type of residential development permitted by zoning laws is detached 
houses on large lots, affordable housing siting and production becomes 
nearly impossible. 
Zoning laws typically are generated by local governments, as most states 
have delegated their police power over zoning to local authorities.  This 
system allows each municipality to promulgate zoning laws that serve only 
the perceived interest of that locality, without consideration of the effect of 
their laws on the larger region.73  A result of exclusionary zoning is that 
many metropolitan areas have nearly no land outside the central city that is 
zoned for attached housing.74
Oregon’s comprehensive legislation prohibits exclusionary zoning 
barriers to enable housing development throughout metro regions.  This 
aspect of the law is discussed next, followed by an illustration of a less 
vigorous approach, the Massachusetts Low and Moderate Income Housing 
Act. 
 71. Id. at 286. 
 72. Robert L. Liberty, Abolishing Exclusionary Zoning: A Natural Policy Alliance for 
Environmentalists and Affordable Housing Advocates, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 581, 
582-84 (2003). 
 73. Florence W. Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration: Lessons for the 
21st Century, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 65, 94-95 (2001) [hereinafter Roisman, Opening the 
Suburbs to Racial Integration]. 
 74. Id. at 65-67. 
FORDHAMPP2 5/1/2006  2:15:50 PM 
2006] REDUCING CONCENTRATED POVERTY 113 
 
1. Oregon Prohibits Exclusionary Zoning 
Because exclusionary zoning is an enormous barrier to the provision of 
affordable housing,  the Oregon legislature has declared that “[t]he 
availability of affordable, decent, safe and sanitary housing opportunities 
for persons of lower, middle and fixed income, including housing for 
farmworkers, is a matter of statewide concern.”75  Oregon’s legislation 
includes provisions directed at ensuring sufficient residential development 
to meet the needs for housing in general, and affordable housing in 
particular. 
The LCDA prohibits exclusionary zoning by enacting statewide 
standards to which all local zoning provisions must adhere.  Under the 
LCDA, a local government may not prohibit, from all residential zones, 
housing types such as attached housing, multifamily housing, manufactured 
homes, or government-assisted housing.76  With the exception of cities with 
populations under 2,500 and counties with populations less than 15,000, all 
local governments must zone to provide for all housing types determined to 
meet the need for housing within a UGB at particular price and rent 
levels.77
LCDC adopted nineteen statewide planning goals pursuant to its 
authority under the LCDA to adopt “goals and guidelines for use by state 
agencies, local governments, and special districts in preparing, adopting, 
amending and implementing” comprehensive land use plans.78  Goal 10 
(Housing)79 requires that plans “encourage the availability of adequate 
numbers of needed housing units at price ranges and rent levels which are 
commensurate with the financial capabilities of Oregon households and 
allow for flexibility of housing location, type and density.”80  The 
guidelines81 for Goal 10 recommend that comprehensive plans include 
 75. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.307(1) (2005). 
 76. § 197.312. 
 77. §§ 197.303-.307. 
 78. § 197.225.  The LCDC’s statewide planning goals “express the state’s policies on 
land use and on related topics, such as citizen involvement, housing, and natural resources.”  
Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development, Goals, 
http://www.lcd.state.or.us/LCD/goals.shtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
 79. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-015-0000 (2005). 
 80. Oregon’s Statewide Planning Goals & Guidelines, GOAL 10: HOUSING, 
http://www.lcd.state.or.us/LCD/docs/goals/goal10.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2006) 
[hereinafter GOAL 10: HOUSING). 
 81. Many of Oregon’s statewide planning goals include non-mandatory guidelines, 
which suggest how the given goal may be applied.  Oregon Department of Land 
Conservation and Development, Goals, http://www.lcd.state.or.us/LCD/goals.shtml (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
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inventories of buildable land and, at a minimum: 
(1) a comparison of the distribution of the existing population by income 
with the distribution of available housing units by cost; 
(2) a determination of vacancy rates, both overall and at varying rent 
ranges and cost levels; 
(3) a determination of expected housing demand at varying rent ranges 
and cost levels; 
(4) allowance for a variety of densities and types of residences in each 
community; and 
(5) an inventory of sound housing in urban areas including units capable 
of being rehabilitated.82
In 1978, LCDC demonstrated83 that Goal 10 would be enforced to 
reform exclusionary zoning practices by relying on it to invalidate a City of 
Durham ordinance that doubled the city’s minimum residential lot size.84  
Goal 10 became the basis for statutes mandating planning and zoning for 
multiple family housing, government-assisted housing, farmworker 
housing and manufactured housing, and prohibiting local governments 
from using home rule charters as the basis for excluding such housing.85
The Land Conservation and Development Department also adopted 
administrative rules implementing Goal 10.  One rule applies statewide,86 
and the other—the metropolitan housing rule—applies to land within the 
Portland metropolitan area UGB.87  The metropolitan housing rule requires 
all but the smallest cities within the Portland UGB to “designate sufficient 
buildable land to provide the opportunity for at least 50 percent of new 
residential units to be attached single family housing or multiple family 
housing or justify an alternative percentage based on changing 
circumstances.”88
The metropolitan housing rule also specifies overall residential density 
levels that most cities within the Portland UGB must maintain.  These 
density levels range from six or more dwelling units per buildable acre for 
 82. GOAL 10: HOUSING, supra note 80. 
 83. Prior to the creation of the Land Use Board of Appeals in 1979, local government 
land use decisions and limited land use decisions were appealed to LCDC.  Liberty, supra 
note 72, at 592 n.72. 
 84. Id. at 591-92 (describing the anti-exclusionary intent of Goal 10, in an effort to 
increase the diversity of housing types and prices). 
 85. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.303, 197.307, 197.312; Liberty, supra note 73, at 593-94. 
 86. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-008-0000 to 660-008-0040 (2005). 
 87. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-007-0000 to 660-007-0060. 
 88. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-007-0030. 
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smaller cities, to ten or more units per acre for the city of Portland and 
other larger cities within the UGB.89  Although state legislation does not 
impose specific density requirements, the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld 
the metropolitan housing rule’s density requirements, finding that, absent 
contrary statutory provisions, LCDC acted within its authority in 
mandating density levels.90
Implementation of Goal 10 quickly increased the availability of 
buildable lands for housing in the Portland metropolitan region.  Between 
1977 and 1982, although land zoned for residential use increased by only 
ten percent, the maximum number of buildable units more than doubled, 
from 129,000 to 301,000.91  The cost of vacant residential lots also 
decreased, because the average size of vacant residential lots decreased.92
2. Massachusetts’ Response to Exclusionary Zoning 
The Massachusetts Low and Moderate Income Housing Act 
(“Massachusetts Act” or “the Act”), colloquially known as the Anti-Snob 
Zoning Law, illustrates a less comprehensive legislative approach to 
eliminating exclusionary zoning.93  The Massachusetts Act streamlines the 
permit application process for subsidized housing by allowing developers 
to file a single application with the zoning board of appeals, rather than 
requiring separate applications to the applicable local boards.94  
Applications for subsidized housing are to be granted if they are “consistent 
with local needs” for low-income and moderate-income housing.95
The Massachusetts Act provides an incentive for jurisdictions to provide 
some affordable housing by creating a presumption that requirements or 
regulations detrimental to permit applications are “consistent with local 
needs” in jurisdictions in which more than ten percent of housing is 
affordable to low- and moderate-income households, or in which at least 
 89. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-007-0035. 
 90. City of Happy Valley v. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 677 P.2d 43, 46 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1984). 
 91. Robert L. Liberty, Oregon’s Comprehensive Growth Management Program: An 
Implementation Review and Lessons for Other States, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 10367, 10379 
(1992). 
 92. Id. (citing MARK GREENFIELD, 1000 FRIENDS OF OR., THE IMPACT OF OREGON’S 
LAND USE PLANNING PROGRAM ON HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES IN THE PORTLAND 
METROPOLITAN REGION 4, 17-18 (1982)). 
 93. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (2005). 
 94. § 21. 
 95. See § 23 (“If the Committee finds . . . that the decision of the Board of Appeals was 
unreasonable and not consistent with local needs, it shall . . . direct the board to issue a 
comprehensive permit . . . .”); § 20 (defining “consistent with local needs”). 
FORDHAMPP2 5/1/2006  2:15:50 PM 
116 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIII 
1.5 percent of all land zoned for residential, commercial, or industrial use 
contains such housing.96  The Massachusetts Supreme Court has made it 
clear that this legislation gives the zoning board of appeals the authority to 
override local exclusionary zoning practices.97  The Massachusetts Act is 
also supported by a number of state subsidy programs for affordable 
housing that promote mixed-income housing, rather than monolithic low-
income “projects.”98
The Massachusetts Act has spurred considerable construction of 
subsidized housing in suburban jurisdictions that were unlikely to have 
such housing but for the Act.  Since 1969, when it was passed, “18,000 
affordable units have been built in at least 173 Massachusetts cities and 
towns.”99
But the little available evidence indicates that this new housing has 
largely benefited Whites, and has “exacerbated racial segregation.”100  
According to Paul Stockman, “[t]he [Massachusetts] Act makes no 
distinction between family [housing] and elderly housing.101  Most new 
affordable units for the elderly benefited White residents who already lived 
in the vicinity of the new housing.102  Stockman further notes that “[o]nly 
one-third of the units constructed pursuant to the Act have been family 
housing.”103  Critics also question the passive approach of the 
Massachusetts Act, as it neither mandates affordable housing production 
nor creates subsidies to encourage its production.104
Stockman, however, suggests that the Act’s passivity makes it less 
controversial, and thus more durable, than more activist measures.105  
According to Stockman, “[b]y making participation optional on the part of 
developers, the Act avoids creating some of the disincentives that plague 
other inclusionary schemes.”106  Stockman concludes that the 
Massachusetts Act’s passive approach “essential to the program’s 
 
 96. § 20. 
 97. Paul K. Stockman, Anti-Snob Zoning in Massachusetts: Assessing One Attempt at 
Opening the Suburbs to Affordable Housing, 78 VA. L. REV. 535, 553 (1992) (citing Bd. of 
Appeals v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 294 N.E.2d 393, 423 (Mass. 1973)). 
 98. Id. at 554. 
 99. Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration, supra note 73, at 73. 
 100. Id. at 74-75. 
 101. Stockman, supra note 97, at 557 n.147. 
 102. Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration, supra note 73, at 75. 
 103. Stockman, supra note 97, at 564 n.187. 
 104. Id. at 565-66. 
 105. Id. at 566. 
 106. Id. 
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continued existence and feasibility.”107
C. Urban Growth Management to Reduce Sprawl and Promote Infill 
Urban growth management limits the amount of land available for 
conversion to urban uses, which can reduce the harmful effects of 
unrestricted sprawl.  Growth management policies, by requiring careful 
designation of lands available for development, also can lead to more infill 
development in central cities and older inner-ring suburbs.  Infill with 
higher-end housing and commercial space has the potential to spark 
renewal in financially depressed and resource-poor urban areas. 
As part of its comprehensive land use legislation, Oregon requires any 
metropolitan service district to adopt a UGB,108 which Portland region’s 
district, “Metro,” has done.109  While some metropolitan areas in other 
states have adopted some type of UGB, it has not been in the context of a 
comprehensive legislative approach such as Oregon’s LCDA.  This 
comprehensive policy context is important to the effectiveness of a UGB 
and is why the Portland region’s UGB is the model discussed in this article. 
1. The Portland Metropolitan Region UGB 
Goal 14 (Urbanization)110 most directly implements urban growth 
management by mandating UGBs.  Goal 14 requires local governments “to 
identify and separate urban and urbanizable land from rural land.”111  To 
guide local governments in setting and modifying their UGBs, Goal 14 sets 
out seven relevant factors: 
(1) Demonstrated need to accommodate long-range urban population 
growth requirements consistent with LCDC goals; 
(2) Need for housing, employment opportunities, and livability; 
(3) Orderly and economic provision for public facilities and services; 
(4) Maximum efficiency of land uses within and on the fringe of the 
existing urban area; 
(5) Environmental, energy, economic and social consequences; 
 107. Id. 
 108. OR. REV. STAT § 268.390(3) (2005). 
 109. Metro, Regional Framework Plan, http://www.metro-
region.org/article.cfm?articleid=432 (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).  See also supra notes 42-43 
and accompanying text for an explanation of Metro. 
 110. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-015-0000 (2005). 
 111. Oregon’s Statewide Planning Goals & Guidelines, GOAL 14: URBANIZATION, 
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/goals/goal14.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2006). 
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(6) Retention of agricultural land as defined, with Class I being the 
highest priority for retention and Class VI the lowest priority; and 
(7) Compatibility of the proposed urban uses with nearby agricultural 
activities.112
Land within UGBs is considered “urbanizable,” meaning that it is 
available over time for urban uses.113  Decisions whether to convert 
urbanizable land to urban uses require a local government to consider the 
following four factors: “(1) Efficient accommodation of identified land 
needs; (2) Orderly and economic provision of public facilities and services; 
(3) Comparative environmental, energy, economic, and social 
consequences; and (4) Compatibility of the proposed urban uses with the 
agricultural and forest activities occurring on farm and forest land outside 
the UGB.”114
As the following subsections discuss, the effects of the Portland region’s 
UGB on affordable housing availability and residential integration appear 
encouraging. 
2. Effect of the UBG on Affordable Housing in Oregon 
To determine whether the Portland region’s UGB expands affordable 
housing options throughout the metropolitan area requires inquiry into the 
UGB’s effects on the supply of housing and the price of housing.  There 
has been considerable research about price but nearly none about supply.  
This section reviews these studies and then discusses the UGB’s role in 
countering racial segregation.  It also cautions against pairing UBG policies 
with strategies to foster racial and economic diversity by preventing 
displacement. 
a. Effect on Housing Supply 
There has been little empirical investigation of the effect of UGBs on the 
supply of housing.  A literature review published by the Brookings 
Institution attributes the paucity of studies linking growth management and 
housing supply to a lack of data on housing stocks, and to methodological 
difficulties in distinguishing the impact of growth management policies 
from other factors affecting housing supplies.115
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. ARTHUR C. NELSON ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE LINK BETWEEN GROWTH 
MANAGEMENT AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY: THE ACADEMIC EVIDENCE 27 (2002), 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/growthmang.pdf. 
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The Brookings review cites one study by Rolf Pendall that found that 
zoning exclusively for low-density detached homes reduces housing 
supplies.116  The restrictions in housing supply, particularly of rental 
housing, reduced the growth of Black and Hispanic households from these 
areas.117  In contrast, Pendall found that UGBs were associated with shifts 
toward multifamily housing, which may lead to increased racial 
integration.118
b. Effect on Housing Prices 
There is vigorous debate over the effect of UGBs on housing prices.  
This debate has focused on the Portland metropolitan area, Oregon’s largest 
UGB.  Critics of growth management attribute Portland’s rising housing 
costs to its UGB.119  Proponents cite other reasons for the housing price 
increases, and argue that Oregon’s provisions facilitating production of 
affordable housing mitigate the effect that UGBs alone would have on 
housing costs.120
Arguments that UGBs and other growth management policies will 
increase housing prices focus on the cost of detached single-family 
homes.121  This type of housing development consumes the most land, and 
thus is likely to be most affected by increased land costs resulting from 
land-supply restrictions.  What critics generally do not acknowledge is that 
the higher density development encouraged by growth management uses 
less land per unit and thus tends to produce housing that is less expensive 
than detached single family homes.122
The National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC) calculates the 
affordability of rental housing in every state, county, and metropolitan 
statistical area in the country.123  NLIHC’s 2003 statistics show that 
 116. Id. at 36 (noting that low-density zoning shifted housing stock from multifamily and 
rental units, thus reducing the affordability of rental housing). 
 117. Rolf Pendall, Local Land Use Regulation and the Chain of Exclusion, 66 J. AM. 
PLAN. ASS’N 125, 138-39 (2000). 
 118. Id. at 129 (noting that UGBs may encourage high-density, multifamily development 
by raising land prices). 
 119. Liberty, supra note 72, at 598-99 (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF HOME BUILDERS, HOUSING 
OPPORTUNITY INDEX: FIRST QUARTER 2002 (2002)). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Nelson, supra note 115, at 17. 
 122. Oliver A. Pollard III, Smart Growth: The Promise, Politics and Potential Pitfalls of 
Emerging Growth Management Strategies, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 284 (2000) (“Promoting 
more compact development and increasing residential densities can lower housing prices by 
reducing the cost of land per unit of housing.”). 
 123. National Low Income Housing Coalition, Out of Reach 2003: America’s Housing 
Wage Climbs, http://www.nlihc.org/oor2003/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) (providing 2003 
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Oregon’s affordable rental housing situation was less dire than in most 
other states. 
NLIHC calculates each jurisdiction’s “housing wage,” which is the 
hourly wage a full-time worker would have to earn to afford a two-
bedroom apartment at the area’s fair market rent.124  In 2003, the fair 
market rent for a two-bedroom apartment in Oregon was $707 per month, 
and the housing wage was $13.59 per hour.125  Oregon’s housing wage 
ranked twenty-second highest out of fifty-two jurisdictions that included 
the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.126  These 
numbers do not present the full picture of housing affordability unless the 
area’s average wages also are taken into consideration.  In 2003, Oregon 
was one of thirteen states with a minimum wage higher than the federal 
minimum wage of $5.15.127  The result is that Oregon was one of only ten 
states in which the housing wage was less than twice the minimum 
wage.128  This is not to suggest that access to affordable housing was not a 
problem in Oregon in 2003, only that the problem was less severe than in 
most other states. 129
A 2002 National Center for Public Policy Research (NCPPR) paper 
takes the position that UGBs necessarily increase the cost of housing by 
restricting the supply of land.130  The NCPPR concludes that “[p]oor and 
minority families pay a disproportionate amount of the social and economic 
results). 
 124. National Low Income Housing Coalition, Out of Reach 2003, Introduction, 
http://www.nlihc.org/oor2003/introduction.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2006). 
 125. National Low Income Housing Coalition, Out of Reach 2003: America’s Housing 
Wage Climbs, Oregon, 
http://www.nlihc.org/oor2003/data.php?getstate=on&state%5B%5D=OR (last visited Feb. 
8, 2006) [hereinafter America’s Housing Wage Climbs, Oregon]. 
 126. National Low Income Housing Coalition, Out of Reach 2003, State Ranks Based on 
Two Bedroom Housing Wage, http://www.nlihc.org/oor2003/table9.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 
2006) 
 127. See JEFF CHAPMAN, ECON. POLICY INST., EPI ISSUE BRIEF: STATES MOVE ON 
MINIMUM WAGE 4 (2003), available at http://www.epinet.org/issuebriefs/ib195/ib195.pdf.  
Oregon’s statewide minimum wage was $6.90 in 2003.  Id. 
 128. See National Low Income Housing Coalition, Out of Reach 2003: America’s 
Housing Wage Climbs, http://www.nlihc.org/oor2003/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) (providing 
the data necessary to draw this conclusion).  Only Alaska and Washington had minimum 
wages higher than Oregon’s $6.90 in 2003.  CHAPMAN, supra note 127, at 4. 
 129. In 2003, forty-four percent of Oregon renters were unable to afford a two-bedroom 
apartment at fair market rent, and the housing wage was only slightly less than twice the 
minimum wage.  America’s Housing Wage Climbs, Oregon, supra note 125. 
 130. CTR. FOR ENVTL. JUSTICE, NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, SMART GROWTH 
AND ITS EFFECTS ON HOUSING MARKETS: THE NEW SEGREGATION iii-iv (2002), available at 
http://www.nationalcenter.org/NewSegregation.pdf. 
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costs of growth restrictions,” particularly increased home prices.131  
NCPPR concedes however, that the cause and effect relationship between 
site restrictions and rising home prices is “only a potential one,” because 
growth management policies “tend to incorporate mechanisms for 
loosening the restrictions gradually in the face of growth.”132
Indeed, many studies suggest that the UGB’s effect on housing prices 
has been small, and that other factors may account for the changes.  Robert 
Liberty cites data from the National Association of Homebuilders showing 
that while Portland is among the least affordable cities in the country, the 
median price of single-family homes is comparable to or lower than prices 
in similar western cities, and its ratio of median family income to median 
home price is more favorable.133  Michael Lewyn reaches a similar 
conclusion after comparing Portland’s housing prices to those of other 
western cities.134
Similarly, Justin Phillips and Eban Goodstein found that Portland’s 
UGB “has created upward pressure on housing prices, but the effect is 
relatively small in magnitude.”135  After comparing Portland housing prices 
to those in other western metropolitan areas and conducting regression 
analyses to measure the effects of various factors on housing prices, 
Phillips and Goodstein attribute most of the increase in Portland housing 
prices to the area’s economic growth, and to the alignment of Portland 
prices with those of other western metropolitan areas.136
Anthony Downs offers a more nuanced analysis.  He refutes the claim 
that UGBs inevitably cause home prices to rise faster.137  Downs found that 
home prices in Portland rose faster than in other communities in the region 
only during the period from 1990-94, but not during the rest of the 
1990s.138  He also tentatively concluded that the UGB had a significant 
impact on rising prices only from 1990-94, but not in the late 1990s.139  He 
attributes the 1990-94 increases to a combination of job growth and the 
 131. Id. at v. 
 132. Id. at 10. 
 133. Liberty, supra note 72, at 598-99 (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF HOME BUILDERS, HOUSING 
OPPORTUNITY INDEX: FIRST QUARTER 2002 (2002)). 
 134. See Michael Lewyn, Oregon’s Growth Boundaries: Myth and Reality, 32 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10160, 10162 (2002). 
 135. Justin Phillips & Eban Goodstein, Growth Management and Housing Prices: The 
Case of Portland, Oregon, 18 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 334, 334 (2000). 
 136. Id. at 342. 
 137. Anthony Downs, Have Housing Prices Risen Faster in Portland than Elsewhere?, 
13 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 7, 7 (2002). 
 138. Id. at 12. 
 139. Id. at 25. 
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resulting buoyant consumer attitudes, relatively low housing production 
during the early 1990s,140 and Metro’s 1992 decision not to expand 
significantly the UGB boundary.141
Downs reasoned that the UGB did not influence home prices in the 
Portland region during the 1980s because the impact of the UGB’s twenty-
year supply of land was not yet felt, and because job and wage growth was 
not rapid in the 1980s.142  He found no simple relationship between UGBs 
and housing prices, but suggested that Metro might need to expand strict 
UGBs in times of rapid job and income growth to ensure housing 
affordability.143  Commenting on Downs’s paper, William Fischel argues 
that Downs understates the propensity of UGBs to cause housing price 
increases.144  Fischel contends that, by comparing Portland’s housing price 
increases only to those of other western cities, Downs downplays the effect 
of UGBs because most western cities have growth controls.145
While a UGB as a stand-alone policy may increase housing costs by 
limiting the land supply available for development, other measures can 
mitigate this effect and make housing more affordable.  For example, 
Robert Stacey credits the efficiency and certainty of Oregon’s development 
permitting process—in particular the 120-day time limit for local 
governments to review and make final decisions on permit applications—
with reducing development costs.146  According to Stacey, zoning and 
policy changes leading to a “dramatic reduction in [the] average minimum 
lot size in the Portland metro area” have also had a moderating effect on 
housing costs.147
Robert Nelson also favors this comprehensive approach to Portland-style 
urban containment.148  He argues that urban containment policies are the 
wave of the future, making the relevant question not whether, but how 
urban containment policies will be implemented.149  In a 2002 review of 
the literature on growth management and housing affordability, Nelson and 
his colleagues determined that growth management policies that simply 
 140. William A. Fischel, Comment on Anthony Downs’s Have Housing Prices Risen 
Faster in Portland than Elsewhere?, 13 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 43, 45 (2002). 
 141. Downs, supra note 137 at 27-28. 
 142. Id. at 27. 
 143. Id. at 29. 
 144. Fischel, supra note 140, at 44. 
 145. Id. at 47. 
 146. Robert Stacey, Urban Growth Boundaries: Saying Yes to Strengthening 
Communities, 34 CONN. L. REV. 597, 601-02 (2002). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See Nelson et al., supra note 115, at 36-37. 
 149. Id. at 35-36. 
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restrict available land should cause housing prices to rise, but policies that 
restrict land supplies while also facilitating housing production need not.150  
In that review, Nelson concluded that (1) “[m]arket demand, not land 
constraints, is the primary determinant of housing prices”;151 (2) “[b]oth 
traditional land use regulations and growth management policies can raise 
the price of housing”;152 and (3) if housing prices may rise under any type 
of land use management, then the decision to be made is which policies 
will mitigate both the adverse effects of urban growth and the adverse price 
effects on lower-income households.153
Significantly, Nelson recommends that UGBs in other regions be 
combined with measures to facilitate development, as they are in 
Oregon.154  These coordinated measures include periodic review of the 
assessment of land necessary for anticipated development, zoning for 
higher density development, and expedited permit processes.155  Carl 
Abbott agrees, suggesting that UGBs work best when combined, as they 
are in Oregon, with other planning measures such as “public transit 
investment, infill development, and affordable housing strategies.”156
Similarly, while Nelson and Susan Wachter concede that growth 
management programs like Oregon’s tend to increase housing costs,157 they 
contend that such programs can be implemented in ways that do not 
preclude affordable housing.158  They argue that inclusionary zoning might 
be more likely to succeed as part of a statewide land-use planning scheme 
than as a local policy because, without a statewide mandate, local 
communities tend to zone out affordable housing as a strategy to maintain a 
high local tax base.159
UGBs may frustrate the operation of the “trickle-down” approach to 
 150. Id. at 34. 
 151. Id. at 33. 
 152. Id. at 34. 
 153. Id. at 35-36 (“Growth management programs can mitigate adverse effects, however, 
by lowering the costs of providing public infrastructure, minimizing regulatory delays, and 
prohibiting exclusionary zoning practices.”). 
 154. Id. at 34 (noting that Oregon’s growth policies “include both urban growth 
boundaries (UGBs) to protect rural resource land and a host of strong measures to reduce 
regulatory barriers in developing areas”). 
 155. Arthur C. Nelson, Comment on Anthony Downs’s Have Housing Prices Risen Faster 
in Portland Than Elsewhere?, 13 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 33, 37 (2002). 
 156. Carl Abbott, The Portland Region: Where City and Suburbs Talk to Each Other – 
And Often Agree, 8 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 11, 41 (1997). 
 157. Arthur C. Nelson & Susan M. Wachter, Growth Management and Affordable 
Housing Policy, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 173, 173-74 (2003). 
 158. Id. at 174. 
 159. Id. at 181. 
FORDHAMPP2 5/1/2006  2:15:50 PM 
124 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIII 
 
affordable housing, a process by which the flight of the affluent to outlying 
suburbs decreases home prices in the neighborhoods they abandon, making 
them more affordable to those lower down the economic ladder.160  Yet, 
while this process can make housing less costly, it undercuts the value of 
homeownership as a wealth-generating mechanism in the increasingly 
devalued neighborhoods.161
c. Effect on Residential Racial Segregation 
Black-White racial segregation has decreased in the Portland region.  
The region is one of the nation’s least class-segregated metropolitan areas, 
and it became even more economically integrated during the 1990s.162  
These pro-opportunity trends may flow in part from the region’s growth 
management policies.  Limiting sprawl can help increase access to 
opportunity by reducing residential racial segregation. 
While sprawl may depress real housing prices, making home purchases 
more accessible to Black residents, the same process that lead to this 
outcome can also lead to greater racial segregation.  Moreover, studies have 
shown that Black homeowners, more than any others, are steered toward 
real estate that actually loses equity value.163  These properties generally 
are located in highly stressed inner-ring suburbs.164
Matthew Kahn investigated the relationship between sprawl and Black 
home ownership.165  He found that sprawl reduces the Black/White housing 
consumption gap by increasing the supply of land for development, which 
in turn increases affordability.166  Using regression analysis, he found that 
Black households in highly sprawled metropolitan areas occupied larger 
housing units and were more likely to own their homes than were Black 
 160. See, e.g., Tessa Melvin, Legislators Face Their Critics on Housing, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 17, 1992. 
 161. Abbott, supra note 156, at 36. 
 162. TODD SWANSTROM ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., PULLING APART: ECONOMIC 
SEGREGATION AMONG SUBURBS AND CENTRAL CITIES IN MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS 8-9 
(2004), available at http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20041018_econsegregation.pdf. 
 163. See, e.g., Myron Orfield, Racial Segregation and Community Revitalization, 58 
VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter Orfield, Racial Segregation and Community 
Revitalization]; Joe T. Darden & Sameh M. Kamel, Black Residential Segregation in the 
City and Suburbs of Detroit: Does Socioeconomic Status Matter?, 22 J. URB. AFFAIRS 1, 10-
11 (2000). 
 164. Orfield, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 1, at 34-38. 
 165. See generally Matthew E. Kahn, Does Sprawl Reduce the Black/White Housing 
Consumption Gap?, 12 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 77 (2001) (using 1997 American Housing 
Survey data to show that black families are more likely to own homes in areas of sprawl). 
 166. Id. at 84. 
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households in regions without as much sprawl.167
Kahn’s analysis contains its own counter-argument, however.  He posits 
two explanations for his findings.  First, greater land supply in sprawled 
areas lowers housing prices.168 Second, “as jobs move to the fringe in 
sprawling metro areas, inner-city housing stock that is far from 
employment opportunities becomes cheaper.”169  Kahn thus concedes, 
“[w]hile housing opportunities for Blacks may improve with sprawl, the 
quality of life for minorities could decline in sprawling areas if suburban 
growth leads to less access to jobs and increases income segregation.”170
If sprawl leads to increased racial segregation, then urban growth 
boundaries could stem further segregation and perhaps promote racial 
integration.  Indeed, a recent study found that urban containment policies 
decrease racial segregation.171  Arthur Nelson, Casey Dawkins, and 
Thomas Sanchez compared the 1990-2000 changes in the index of 
dissimilarity—a common measure of segregation—for the Black 
population relative to the White population among selected metropolitan 
areas, both those with and those without urban containment policies.172  
They found that, although Black-White segregation declined in nearly all 
metropolitan areas in the United States, segregation declined faster, on 
average, among regions with growth containment policies.173
More specific to the Portland region, Nelson and Wachter found that 
Black-White residential segregation declined in Portland at twice the 
average national rate between 1990 and 2000.174  The region’s Black-White 
dissimilarity value fell fifteen points—from sixty-four in 1990 to forty-
eight in 2000.175  Across all metropolitan areas, Black-White dissimilarity 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 84-85; see also Arthur C. Nelson et al., Urban Containment and Residential 
Segregation: A Preliminary Investigation, 41 URB. STUDIES 423, 435 (2004) (“[A]lthough 
planning efforts to improve the supply of affordable housing may result in an increase in the 
total number of affordable units per renter, these programs may also be perversely fostering 
segregation . . . .”). 
 171. See Nelson et al., supra note 170, at 435 (“Generally speaking, metropolitan areas 
with urban containment policies have seen average declines in segregation of approximately 
two points over the period.”). 
 172. Id. at 429-31. 
 173. Id. at 431. 
 174. Nelson & Wachter, supra note 157, at 173. 
 175. Metropolitan Racial and Ethnic Change – Census 2000, Portland-Vancouver, OR-
WA PMSA, Data for the Metropolitan Statistical Area, 
http://mumford1.dyndns.org/cen2000/WholePop/WPSegdata/6440msa.htm (last visited Feb. 
11, 2005) [hereinafter Portland-Vancouver Census Data]. 
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decreased nearly as much during the 1990s—twelve percentage points, to 
fifty-two.176  (Dissimilarity values of sixty or above are very high, while 
values of forty to fifty reflect moderate residential segregation.177  Changes 
in dissimilarity values exceeding ten points during a decade are considered 
very significant.)178
Black-White segregation, however, declined fastest in metropolitan 
areas where the Black population shares were under five percent.179  
Nevertheless, although the Portland metropolitan area had a small Black 
population share in 2000—roughly three percent180—it is desegregating 
even faster than other areas with small Black population shares.  The 
region’s twenty-one point decline in its Black-White dissimilarity value not 
only is more than twice the pace of the national average decline between 
1980 and 2000 (nine points),181 but it also exceeds the twelve-point average 
decline for metro areas with Black population shares of less than five 
percent.182
In the Portland region, Hispanics comprised approximately seven 
percent of the population in 2000183 and were far less segregated from 
Whites than Blacks.184  Even so, Hispanic-White segregation is increasing 
in Portland.185  The Hispanic-White dissimilarity index for the Portland 
region increased from twenty-two in 1980 to thirty-five in 2000.186  Yet, 
Portland’s Hispanic-White dissimilarity index remains well below the 
average value of forty-nine (a four-point increase across twenty years) for 
regions with Hispanic population shares of five to ten percent.187
In addition to having relatively less racial segregation, for decades 
Portland has been “one of the most class-integrated metropolitan areas in 
the country.”188  The Oregonian, Portland’s major newspaper, reported that 
 176. Nelson & Wachter, supra note 157, at 173. 
 177. JOHN LOGAN ET AL., LEWIS MUMFORD CTR., UNIV. AT ALBANY, ETHNIC DIVERSITY 
GROWS, NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION LAGS BEHIND 2 (2001), available at 
http://mumford1.dyndns.org/cen2000/WholePop/WPreport/MumfordReport.pdf.
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 4. 
 180. See Portland-Vancouver Census Data, supra note 175. 
 181. Id. (noting that the Portland metropolitan region’s Black-White dissimilarity value 
fell from sixty-nine in 1980 to forty-eight in 2000). 
 182. LOGAN ET AL., supra note 177, at 4. 
 183. Portland-Vancouver Census Data, supra note 175. 
 184. Id. (showing the Hispanic-white dissimilarity indexes at thirty-five, and the black-
white dissimilarity index at forty-eight). 
 185. LOGAN ET AL., supra note 177, at 17. 
 186. Portland-Vancouver Census Data, supra note 175. 
 187. LOGAN ET AL., supra note 177, at 14. 
 188. Abbott, supra note 156, at 24. 
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“Portland and its suburbs became more economically integrated during the 
1990s,” unlike most metropolitan areas.189  As of 2000, households earning 
less than the region’s median income constituted at least one-third of the 
population in all but one Portland suburb.190  David Bell, a partner at 
Portland-based GSL Properties, attributes this economic integration in the 
Portland region to the metropolitan housing rule’s requirement191 that cities 
within the Portland UGB zone enable construction of a substantial number 
of multiple-family units. 192
3. Can an Oregon-Style UGB Approach Work Elsewhere? 
Analysts disagree over whether Portland’s success can be replicated in 
other metropolitan regions.  Those who think not tend to focus on the 
unique characteristics of the Portland region.193  Some, however, suggest 
that there may be limited replicability in somewhat similar places.  For 
example, William Fischel believes that Portland’s growth containment 
policies probably cause higher housing prices, 194 which “look a bit out of 
line.”195
Believing Portland to be a rather unique case, Carl Abbott contends that 
several unusual regional features made policies such as urban growth 
restrictions and affordable housing development more palatable in the 
Portland region than they would be in most other metropolitan areas.196  He 
observes that Portland’s small non-White population, and its dispersal 
throughout the metropolitan area—White flight to the suburbs—is less of 
an issue there than in cities that have larger populations of color.197  Abbott 
also believes Portlanders were more amenable to urban growth restrictions 
to preserve the unique value of the nearby Willamette Valley agricultural 
lands, a finite resource geographically limited to a small area by the 
surrounding mountains.198
In contrast, Henry Richmond is more optimistic about the replicability of 
 189. Betsy Hammond, Income Groups Intermingle, OREGONIAN, May 15, 2002, at A1. 
 190. Id. (“The Oregon figures show that households earning less than $50,000—roughly 
the median income for the metro area—constitute at least a third of every city except Happy 
Valley.”). 
 191. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-007-0000 to –0060 (2005). 
 192. Hammond, supra note 189, at A1. 
 193. See infra notes 196-198 and accompanying text. 
 194. Fischel, supra note 140, at 44. 
 195. Id. at 48. 
 196. Abbott, supra note 156, at 26 (“[C]ity-suburban politics have not revolved around 
race and racial avoidance.”). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 28 n.8. 
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Oregon’s land use reforms.  He characterizes the Oregon land use scheme 
as “prodevelopment,”199  because development is encouraged within 
UGBs,200 and both the higher-density zoning201 and the expedited 
permitting process facilitate development.202  Richmond views Portland’s 
success as the result of tough policy choices that have garnered wide 
support because they are in the region’s economic self-interest.203  Thus, 
any region interested in changing its land use policies to better support the 
region’s economic well-being could choose to accept the benefits of a 
comprehensive approach to urban growth management. 
D. Development Linked to Transportation 
Transit-oriented development is a complementary means to link low-
income residents and residents of color with job centers.  It is included in 
the plan for the Portland metropolitan area.  Metro, the region’s elected 
regional governing body, has a “Region 2040” development plan that calls 
for growth over the next forty years to be concentrated in mixed-use 
development in “regional centers” along transit corridors.204  Rail transit 
eventually will connect each of these centers to downtown Portland.205
Some commentators believe that transit-oriented development better 
meets community needs and is a more realistic goal than inclusionary 
zoning.206  Either way, given that non-White residents and the poor are 
least likely to have access to an automobile,207 transit-oriented development 
is an additional approach for connecting people with opportunities.208  This 
type of development is well-suited to be part of a comprehensive approach, 
as the Portland case illustrates.  Thus, the Recommendations section209 
 199. Henry R. Richmond, Comment on Carl Abbott’s “The Portland Region: Where City 
and Suburbs Talk to Each Other – And Often Agree,” 8 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 53, 56 
(1997). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 62. 
 202. Id. at 59. 
 203. Id. at 54. 
 204. Stacey, supra note 146, at 603-04. 
 205. Id. at 606-07; see also Abbott, supra note 156, at 30. 
 206. See Daniel R. Mandelker, The Affordable Housing Element in Comprehensive 
Plans, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 565 (2003); see also infra Part III. 
 207. “In 1995, 24 percent of black households had no car, compared to 5 percent of white 
households and 12 percent of Latino households.”  STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. STOLL, 
BROOKINGS INST., MODEST PROGRESS: THE NARROWING SPATIAL MISMATCH BETWEEN 
BLACKS AND JOBS IN THE 1990S 14 n.4 (2002), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/Raphael_Stoll_spatial_mismatch.pdf. 
 208. Kushner, supra note 12, at 58-60. 
 209. See infra Part VI. 
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includes James Kushner’s transit-oriented development proposals.210
III. INCLUSIONARY HOUSING POLICIES 
Inclusionary housing policies are designed to ensure that affordable units 
are included in new residential developments.  They accomplish this either 
by mandating that a percentage of units be affordable, or by offering 
incentives for developers to include affordable units.  Inclusionary housing 
laws—also known as inclusionary zoning laws—can increase the stock of 
affordable housing, and can alleviate the economic segregation common to 
large, fragmented metropolitan areas. 
In addition, the mixed-income housing developments produced through 
inclusionary zoning can be more acceptable to neighboring residents than 
traditional subsidized low-income housing developments, thus reducing 
NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) resistance.  Inclusionary zoning laws, 
whether mandatory or incentive-based, permit these goals to be advanced 
with little or no direct financial cost to governments and taxpayers. 
A mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinance requires that all new 
residential developments211 include a certain percentage of units that are 
affordable to households of a particular income level (generally defined as 
a percentage of the area’s median income).212  The share of units that must 
be made affordable is the “mandatory set-aside.”213  The laws generally 
will require that the set-aside units be maintained as affordable units for a 
period of at least ten years.214  Because developers may be deterred by the 
reduced profitability of housing projects including affordable units, these 
laws usually include incentives to encourage development.215
A common incentive provision is a waiver of the zoning laws’ limit on 
density levels, which allows developers to increase their profits by building 
additional units on their property by permitting greater densities.216  Other 
statutory development incentives include local tax abatements, waivers of 
permit fees, reductions in the amenities required to be provided by 
developers, and government provision or subsidization of infrastructure in 
 210. Kushner, supra note 12, at 58-60. 
 211. Exceptions are generally made for very small development projects containing only 
a small number of units. 
 212. Robert W. Burchell & Catherine C. Galley, Inclusionary Zoning: Pros and Cons, 
NEW CENTURY HOUSING, Oct. 2000, at 3. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
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support of development.217
New Jersey is the first of the following two case examples.  Its “fair 
share” doctrine218 did not begin with an inclusionary zoning ordinance, yet 
it has evolved to require that municipalities plan to meet their “fair share” 
of their region’s low- and moderate-income housing.  The second case is 
Montgomery County, Maryland, which for three decades has used a 
mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinance and density bonuses to expand 
the availability of affordable housing throughout its metropolitan areas.219
A. New Jersey 
1. Mount Laurel and the New Jersey Fair Housing Act of 1985 
New Jersey’s policies are the product of two New Jersey Supreme Court 
cases—Mount Laurel I220 and Mount Laurel II221—and the New Jersey Fair 
Housing Act (NJFHA).222  While these policies do not explicitly require 
inclusionary zoning, they have nudged widespread implementation of 
inclusionary housing policies in New Jersey. 
In 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court struck down the exclusionary 
zoning ordinance of the small, but developing, township of Mount Laurel 
in Mount Laurel I.223  It concluded that Mount Laurel’s zoning ordinance 
was contrary to the general public welfare clause of the New Jersey State 
Constitution, and outside the municipality’s zoning power.224  It also 
approved an affirmative order requiring that every “municipality must, by 
its land use regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an 
appropriate variety and choice of housing.”225
The court announced, for the first time, the “fair share” principle.226  It 
ruled that a municipality “cannot foreclose the opportunity of the classes of 
people mentioned for low and moderate income housing and in its 
 217. Id.; Marc T. Smith et al., Inclusionary Housing Programs: Issues and Outcomes, 25 
REAL EST. L. J. 155, 155-56 (1996). 
 218. See infra notes 226-228 and accompanying text. 
 219. See infra notes 287-292 and accompanying text. 
 220. S. Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 
1975) [hereinafter Mount Laurel I]. 
 221. S. Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 
1983) [hereinafter Mount Laurel II]. 
 222. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 to -329 (2005). 
 223. 336 A.2d at 730. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 724. 
 226. Id. at 733 (“[E]very municipality therein must bear its fair share of the regional 
burden.”). 
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regulations must affirmatively afford that opportunity, at least to the extent 
of the municipality’s fair share of the present and prospective regional need 
therefore.”227  The court decreed that “[t]hese obligations must be met 
unless the particular municipality can sustain the heavy burden of 
demonstrating peculiar circumstances which dictate that it should not be 
required so to do.”228
In reaching this result, the court reviewed the Township’s justifications 
for exclusionary zoning, and found that they did not meet the heavy burden 
of showing “peculiar circumstances” that would exempt it from the fair 
share standard.229  Significantly, the court required that municipalities 
consider the impact of their actions beyond their borders.  It announced 
“that the general welfare which developing municipalities like Mount 
Laurel must consider extends beyond their boundaries and cannot be 
parochially confined to the claimed good of the particular municipality.”230
Eight years later, in Mount Laurel II,231  the court “established 
guidelines and procedures that would ensure active and detailed judicial 
supervision of local compliance” with the original fair share doctrine.232  
To promote consistency, and to centralize Mount Laurel litigation, the 
court also designated a panel of three judges to determine “fair share” and 
to ensure that municipalities were complying.233  The judges could declare 
zoning ordinances invalid in whole or in part, or could mandate that 
municipalities change specific sections of their ordinances.234
The most significant change, however, was that a municipality no longer 
complied with Mount Laurel simply by eliminating exclusionary zoning.  
Instead, Mount Laurel II required each township to act affirmatively to 
provide a “realistic” opportunity, a “likelihood—to the extent economic 
conditions allow—that the lower income housing will actually be 
constructed.”235
Expressing dissatisfaction at the lack of progress in the creation of fair 
share housing, the court also implemented a “builder’s remedy” applicable 
 227. Id. at 724. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 727-28. 
 230. Id. 
 231. 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). 
 232. G. Alan Tarr & Russell S. Harrison, Legitimacy and Capacity in State Supreme 
Court Policymaking: The New Jersey Court and Exclusionary Zoning, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 513, 
515 (1984). 
 233. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 438-39. 
 234. CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES 
65 (1996). 
 235. 456 A2d. at 422. 
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to places that had not met their fair share of the region’s affordable housing 
needs.236  The builder’s remedy authorized judges to grant developers the 
right to build high-density housing otherwise prohibited by local zoning 
laws, as long as at least twenty percent of the development would be 
affordable units.237
The New Jersey Legislature responded to these Mount Laurel decisions 
by enacting the NJFHA in 1985.238  The NJFHA requires every 
municipality in the state to adopt and implement a housing plan that 
addresses its “fair share of the unmet regional need for housing affordable 
to low- and moderate-income households.”239
To remove the courts from what many saw as a legislative process, the 
NJFHA created the New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing 
(COAH).240  Its role is “to determine municipal fair share housing 
obligations, establish policies as to what types of municipal actions are 
necessary to create realistic opportunities for the provision of housing 
affordable to low- and moderate-income households, and, upon request, to 
review housing plans submitted to it by municipalities.”241  Although 
municipalities are not required to submit their local housing plans to 
COAH, the NJFHA encourages them to do so.  “COAH approval of a local 
plan gives the local ordinance a presumption of validity that may be 
overcome in a court challenge only by clear and convincing evidence that 
the plan will not meet the fair-share obligation.”242
2. Effectiveness of the New Jersey Laws 
A number of researchers and commentators have evaluated the impact of 
New Jersey’s policies.  These analyses find that its policies have increased 
the amount of affordable housing.243  The housing has, however, 
disproportionately benefited Whites and moderate-income persons rather 
than low-income persons, large families, and people of color.  This section 
reviews those studies and presents the resulting recommendations for 
 
 236. Id. at 452. 
 237. Id. at 452 n.37; Note, State-Sponsored Growth Management as a Remedy for 
Exclusionary Zoning, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (1995). 
 238. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 to -329 (2005). 
 239. Naomi B. Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer, The Impact of Mount Laurel Initiatives: An 
Analysis of the Characteristics of Applicants and Occupants, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1268, 
1271 (1997). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. State-Sponsored Growth Management as a Remedy for Exclusionary Zoning, supra 
note 237, at 1135. 
 243. See infra notes 244-267 and accompanying text. 
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improving the New Jersey model. 
Most studies of New Jersey’s fair share program focus on whether 
affordable housing has in fact been produced in suburban New Jersey.  For 
example, a 1995 statewide survey showed that 15,733 suburban units were 
completed or under construction; 1,982 vacated units had been or were 
being rehabilitated; and 4,679 owner occupied units had been or were being 
rehabilitated.244  These numbers fail to account for the affordable housing 
built in communities that moved proactively to forestall Mount Laurel 
litigation, nor do they include housing built as a result of cases settled 
outside the court’s jurisdiction, according to Charles Haar.245  Haar points 
out that tangible benefits, including changed behavior in suburban localities 
and passage of the NJFHA, bear out the impact of the Mount Laurel 
judicial intervention.246
In contrast, “[r]elatively little research has been done on the 
characteristics of the households who have applied for or occupy this 
housing.”247  One such study, examining the years 1983-88, found that 
benefits flowed neither to the lowest-income households nor to people of 
color living in the central city.248  The study made the following findings: 
? Approximately 5,087 low- and moderate-income units were 
built or under construction.249 
? Approximately seventy-five percent of these units were in 
inclusionary developments, where a fixed percentage of units 
are sold or rented at controlled prices, and the remaining twenty-
five percent were in publicly-subsidized developments or 
created by rehabilitating existing structures.250 
? “The Mount Laurel units in inclusionary (market-provided) 
developments were almost always offered for sale rather than 
rental, were usually available without age restrictions, and were 
skewed slightly in favor of being affordable to moderate-income 
rather than low-income unit households.”251  The publicly-
subsidized units were more balanced and had fewer age 
 
 244. Wish & Eisdorfer, supra note 239, at 1273 (citing J. LAGOS, N.J. DEP’T OF CMTY. 
AFFAIRS, 1995 SURVEY OF MOUNT LAUREL HOUSING (1995)). 
 245. HAAR, supra note 234, at 131. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Wish & Eisdorfer, supra note 239, at 1274. 
 248. John M. Payne, Norman Williams, Exclusionary Zoning, and the Mount Laurel 
Doctrine: Making the Theory Fit the Facts, 20 VT. L. REV. 665, 669-70 (1996). 
 249. Id. at 669. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
FORDHAMPP2 5/1/2006  2:15:50 PM 
134 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIII 
restrictions.252 
? Based on then-completed inclusionary developments, the typical 
residents were young married couples with children, drawn from 
households that formerly rented or doubled up.253  Minorities, 
especially Blacks, were under-represented.254 
Wish and Eisdorfer’s 1997 study also reports disappointing results, 
finding that African Americans and Latinos in New Jersey “are 
disproportionately concentrated in a small number of urban areas and are 
dramatically under-represented in the suburbs.”255  Meanwhile, 
employment opportunities over the past thirty years have increased greatly 
in the suburbs and declined in the cities. 256  Wish and Eisdorfer conclude 
that the New Jersey program “has not enabled previously urban residents to 
move to suburban municipalities and has not enabled Blacks and Latinos to 
move from heavily minority urban areas to the suburbs.”257
Wish and Eisdorfer’s research examined the impact of Mount Laurel 
initiatives (the court decisions, the NJFHA, and the COAH) in meeting 
three judicial objectives: 
? To increase housing opportunities for low- and moderate-income 
households. 
? To provide housing opportunities in the suburbs for poor urban 
residents who had been excluded by past suburban zoning 
practices. 
? To ameliorate racial and ethnic residential segregation by 
enabling blacks and Latinos to move from the heavily minority 
urban areas to white suburbs.258 
They reviewed New Jersey Affordable Housing Management Service 
(AHMS) data on occupants of, and applicants for, recently constructed 
low-and moderate-income housing, and concluded that initiatives to date 
have at least partially served the first, but not the second or third 
objectives.259  As to the first objective, however, it appeared that large 
 
 252. Id. at 669-70. 
 253. Id. at 670. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Wish & Eisdorfer, supra note 239, at 1276. 
 256. Id. at 1277. 
 257. Id. at 1305. 
 258. Id. at 1276. 
 259. Id. at 1302.  AHMS is a state agency that helps municipalities and developers 
“administer occupant eligibility standards and affordability controls for low- and moderate-
income housing.”  Id. at 1281. 
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households and very low-income households are under-served. 260  
Specifically, the data showed that the Mount Laurel program had: 
? Failed to produce housing for very low-income households.  
More housing for moderate income households than for low 
income households was produced, some in suburbs that used to 
hold only expensive housing.261 
? Failed to facilitate moves from city to suburb.262  A higher 
percentage of African-American households moved from 
suburbs to cities than vice-versa.263  Many of the moves were 
lateral, with Whites tending to move from suburb to suburb and 
racial minorities from urban setting to urban setting or into 
predominantly minority suburbs.264 
? Failed to achieve racial or ethnic integration.265  New Jersey’s 
suburbs remain predominantly White and there is no sign of 
residential integration along racial and economic lines.266 
The study also revealed that there is a great demand for affordable 
housing among racial-ethnic minorities; that racial-ethnic minorities were 
still being shut out from New Jersey’s suburbs; and that they obtained 
suburban housing less than half as often as Whites.267  Overall, while 
opportunities for affordable housing have been created, the opportunities 
are flowing not to racial minorities, but to White homebuyers. 
Others agree that the New Jersey policies have produced disappointing 
results and suggest ways to improve their effectiveness.  Yet many also 
point to what has worked.  For example, Bernard Ham, discussing Wish 
and Eisendorfer’s study, concludes that “the Mount Laurel mandate of 
producing realistic opportunities for the production of affordable housing 
has largely been a failure.”268  Ham concedes, however, that Mount Laurel 
made “tremendous contributions” in reshaping the role of “local autonomy” 
and home rule in race relations by emphasizing regionalism and fair share 
concepts that, if enforced vigorously, could achieve the doctrine’s full 
 260. Id. at 1301. 
 261. Id. at 1302; see also Bernard K. Ham, Exclusionary Zoning and Racial Segregation: 
A Reconsideration of the Mount Laurel Doctrine, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 577, 609 
(1997). 
 262. Wish & Eisdorfer, supra note 239, at 1302. 
 263. Id. at 1303. 
 264. See Ham, supra note 261, at 608. 
 265. Wish & Eisdorfer, supra note 239, at 1302-04. 
 266. See Ham, supra note 261, at 609. 
 267. Id. at 608. 
 268. Id. at 610. 
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potential.269
In addition to recommendations for vigorous enforcement, 
commentators have encouraged the New Jersey program to take race-
specific measures.270  John Powell contends that without such measures, 
New Jersey “cannot adequately address the housing needs of all poor 
communities.”271  He explains that, in the Mount Laurel cases, the New 
Jersey court shifted emphasis away from protecting the rights of 
minorities.272  The legislature, with the NJFHA, applied “the false premise 
that race issues can be reduced to poverty issues”; failed to acknowledge 
the relationship between race and poverty; and thereby left the issue of 
residential segregation wholly to the local authorities’ discretion.273
Powell argues that race-conscious fair share housing strategies for racial 
minorities require policymakers to recognize “the interrelationship between 
poverty and race in housing.”274  Like “adequacy” suits in the education 
realm, Mount Laurel “general welfare” suits call for inter-district remedies 
that go beyond municipal boundaries to remedy inequalities and embrace 
system-wide approaches.275  While the New Jersey courts and legislature 
recognize affordable housing as part of the “general welfare” that must be 
provided for, it is necessary that racially integrated housing be implicit in 
this understanding of “general welfare.”276  According to Powell, “[a]n 
improved Mount Laurel approach “would go beyond requirements of low-
income housing and would mandate pro-integrative measures.”277  It also 
should attend to the needs of very low-income households.278
Others agree that the Mount Laurel approach has not alleviated the 
problems of New Jersey’s cities.  Peter Buchsbaum contends that the units 
generated have mainly “helped lower-income suburbanites retain residency 
in their areas rather than open up new opportunities for urban people of 
 269. Id. at 611. 
 270. See, e.g., John A. Powell, Injecting a Race Component into Mount Laurel-Style 
Litigation, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1369 passim (1997). 
 271. Id. at 1369. 
 272. Id. at 1371 (“Making explicit reference to other characteristically middle-income or 
temporarily low-income groups——the elderly, young single persons, and large families—
—the court reasoned that minorities were not the sole category of persons excluded by the 
zoning scheme.”). 
 273. Id. at 1372. 
 274. Id. at 1373. 
 275. Id. at 1383. 
 276. Id. (“[I]n Mount Laurel, the general welfare clause imposed a duty to provide the 
basic needs for housing opportunity.  Implicit in this basic need for housing opportunity 
ought to be the requirement of racial integration.”). 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at 1383-84. 
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color.”279  He argues that production figures could be higher under a truly 
comprehensive federally-subsidized program.280  Like Powell, Florence 
Roisman contends that the New Jersey program could be improved if it 
directly acknowledged racial and ethnic integration as a goal.281  Other 
improvements would be to provide subsidies for low-income households 
and to assure the accurate collection and reporting of data.282
Finally, John Boger recommends the implementation of meaningful 
enforcement mechanisms such as gradual reduction of income tax 
deductions for property tax and mortgage interest payments for all 
taxpayers remaining in municipalities that decline to fulfill their fair share 
obligations.283  Boger surmises that a ten percent reduction in tax 
deductions would prompt residents to press their local governments to 
comply with their fair share obligations.284  This mechanism could be 
extended to cover federal tax deductions if the federal government adopted 
a national “fair share” policy.285
Boger does credit the Mount Laurel cases with exposing the power of 
local laws to shape the economic and social characteristics of particular 
communities and thereby state and regional populations.286  Indeed, they 
have had an impact by requiring a regional focus, and by introducing “fair 
share” concepts applicable at a regional scale.  With suggested reforms, the 
New Jersey model could better meet the needs of communities of color and 
low-income persons.  The next case example illustrates a highly effective 
inclusionary zoning law. 
B. Montgomery County, Maryland 
1. The Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit Ordinance 
In 1973, Montgomery County, Maryland, a wealthy suburb northwest of 
Washington, D.C., adopted its Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit (MPDU) 
 279. Peter Buchsbaum, Mount Laurel II: A Ten Year Retrospective, N.J. LAW., Oct. 1993, 
at 13, 17. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Florence W. Roisman, The Role of the State, The Necessity of Race-Conscious 
Remedies, and Other Lessons from the Mount Laurel Study, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1386, 
1388 (1997). 
 282. Id. 
 283. John C. Boger, Mount Laurel at 21 Years: Reflections on the Power of Courts and 
Legislatures to Shape Social Change, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1450, 1462 (1997). 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 1453. 
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program—the nation’s first inclusionary zoning law.287  The MPDU 
program requires that any new housing development of fifty or more units 
set aside 12.5 to fifteen percent of the units for  households earning sixty-
five percent or less of the area’s median income.288  As compensation for 
building the mandated MPDUs, developers can receive a density bonus of 
up to twenty-two percent.289
Rental units must be maintained as affordable units for twenty years, and 
owner-occupied units have price restrictions for ten years.290  After ten 
years, owners of MPDUs can sell their units without price limitations, but 
half of their profits go to the county’s Housing Initiative Fund, which uses 
the revenue to help developers purchase, build and rehabilitate affordable 
housing.291
From a racial equity perspective, a key feature of the Montgomery 
County ordinance is the provision that a substantial portion of the MPDUs 
go to the county’s public housing authority, to be made available to very 
low-income households.  One-third of the MPDUs are offered to the public 
housing authority—the Housing Opportunities Commission (HOC)—and 
qualified nonprofit organizations may purchase additional units, up to a 
total of forty percent of all MPDUs.292  Most of the units purchased by the 
HOC and the nonprofits are maintained as rental units for low- and very 
low-income households.  As of 1999, there were 1,441 such units in the 
hands of the HOC and nonprofits.293  Unlike other MPDUs, which revert to 
market rate after ten to twenty years, these will be maintained as affordable 
units indefinitely.294
 287. See, e.g., KAREN DESTOREL BROWN, BROOKINGS INST., EXPANDING AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING THROUGH EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LESSONS FROM THE WASHINGTON 
METROPOLITAN AREA 5 (2001), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/inclusionary.pdf; DAVID RUSK, INSIDE 
GAME/OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR SAVING URBAN AMERICA 184 (1999) 
[hereinafter RUSK, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME]; David Rusk, Inside Game/Outside Game: 
The Emerging Anti-Sprawl Coalition, NEW CENTURY HOUSING, Oct. 2000, at 13, 13, 
available at 
http://planningcommunications.com/nhc_inclusionary_zoning_viable_solution.pdf 
[hereinafter Rusk, The Emerging Anti-Sprawl Coalition]. 
 288. See BROWN, supra note 287, at 5. 
 289. Id.; Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration, supra note 73, at 78-79. 
 290. See BROWN, supra note 287, at 5. 
 291. Id. at 6-7. 
 292. Id. at 7. 
 293. Id. 
 294. See id. (“Once purchased, these units are set aside as rental for very low- to low-
income households, and will always be in the County’s affordable housing stock.”). 
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2. Effectiveness of Montgomery County’s MPDU 
In contrast to the results in New Jersey, people of color have been the 
primary beneficiaries of the Montgomery County program.  During its first 
twenty-five years of inclusionary housing, Montgomery County produced 
more than 10,500 affordable housing units, all integrated with market-rate 
housing.295  Nearly fourteen percent of these are public housing rental units 
for low- to very low-income households.296
In addition, people of color occupy eighty percent of the new public 
housing rental units, and from 1991 to 1998 people of color accounted for 
approximately fifty-five percent of the purchasers of moderately priced 
dwelling units.297  Moreover, Montgomery County’s more than 10,500 
MPDUs are scattered in almost 400 different subdivisions.298  The local 
housing authority purchased more than 500 MDPUs, located in more than 
200 middle-class subdivisions.299  David Rusk has described the county as 
“one of the nation’s more racially and economically integrated 
communities.”300
Florence Roisman attributes Montgomery County’s success at racial 
integration in large part to two factors.  One is that public housing authority 
purchases a large portion of the MPDUs, and its waiting list of very low-
income households includes many people of color.301  The other factor is 
that purchasers of owner-occupied MPDUs are chosen by a lottery.302  
Information about the lottery is widely distributed throughout the county, 
with the support of fair housing groups and internal networking among 
minority communities.303
One weakness of the Montgomery County ordinance is that it only 
applies to developments with lots smaller than one acre per unit, making 
large-lot developers exempt from its inclusionary requirements.304  The 
ordinance’s fifty-unit threshold size for developments is also generous.  
 295. See Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration, supra note 73, at 79 
(“This ‘outstanding’ program has produced ‘more than 10,110 affordable housing units’ in 
25 years, all well integrated with market-rate housing.”) (quoting Nico Calavita et al., 
Inclusionary Housing in California and New Jersey: A Comparative Analysis, 8 HOUSING 
POL’Y DEBATE 109, 111 (1997)). 
 296. BROWN, supra note 287, at 7. 
 297. Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration, supra note 73, at 78-79. 
 298. RUSK, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME, supra note 287, at 194. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration, supra note 73, at 107. 
 302. Id. at 108. 
 303. Id. 
 304. BROWN, supra note 287, at 5. 
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Other inclusionary zoning laws, including an ordinance in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, apply to developments as small as ten units.305
After reviewing the inclusionary housing ordinances of Montgomery 
County and three other counties in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, 
Karen Brown made several recommendations for improving their 
effectiveness.306  She advocates replication in other jurisdictions of 
Montgomery County’s practice of putting a substantial proportion of the 
new affordable units into the hands of public housing authorities.307  These 
should be maintained indefinitely as rental units for low- and very low-
income households. 
Brown also recommends that Montgomery County broaden the scope of 
its law by applying it to developments smaller than the current threshold of 
fifty units.308  In addition, she would require large-lot developers, currently 
exempt from the law on the theory that production of affordable housing is 
impossible in such developments, to participate in other ways, such as 
contributing money or land for the construction of affordable housing 
elsewhere.309  Finally, Brown suggests measures to make affordable 
housing more attractive both politically and aesthetically, including support 
for coalitions of business, development, and housing organizations aimed at 
educating the public about the benefits of inclusionary housing.310
C. How Policies that use Economic Proxies Can Promote Integration 
Among the prominent statutory programs aimed at producing affordable 
housing, only Montgomery County’s policies have made significant 
progress in ameliorating racial segregation.311  Other states with 
comparable policies include Oregon, New Jersey, California and Florida, 
with their statutes that require municipalities to adopt plans for affordable 
housing, and Massachusetts, with its Comprehensive Permit Law.312  These 
policies may have decreased economic segregation, but they have had little 
impact on racial segregation.313  Some of these programs may even have 
 305. Id. at 24 (“In Cambridge, MA, for instance, any residential development with ten or 
more units (new or converted) must make 15 percent of those units affordable to households 
whose incomes do not exceed 80 percent of the area median.”). 
 306. Id. at 23-26. 
 307. Id. at 23. 
 308. Id. at 24. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. at 25-26.  
 311. Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration, supra note 73, at 71-72. 
 312. Id. at 69-70. 
 313. Id. at 71-72. 
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exacerbated racial segregation by increasing opportunities for poor Whites 
to relocate from integrated areas to predominantly White suburbs.314
Roisman argues that “economics cannot be used as a proxy for race, that 
economic remedies cannot be used to solve racial problems, and that steps 
in addition to the economic remedies are required to promote racial 
integration in the suburbs.”315  She does credit the New Jersey and 
Massachusetts laws with bringing some low-and moderate-income housing 
to suburbs that would not otherwise have below-market rate housing.316  
But racial integration and mobility have not been significantly advanced in 
either place.317
Roisman contrasts these programs with Montgomery County’s 
inclusionary housing ordinance, which has furthered racial integration in 
the county. 318  She attributes Montgomery County’s success at racial 
integration in large part to two factors, the first being the public housing 
authority’s control over a large number of the new affordable units.319  The 
second factor is the use of a lottery to identify purchasers of affordable 
housing, instead of simply placing the units on the market where 
purchasers might be subject to racial steering, preferences for local 
residents, and other factors that disadvantage persons of color.320
One lesson to be learned from Montgomery County is that policies that 
are not explicitly race-based can advance racial integration if they are 
carefully administered in ways that frustrate the typical operation of White 
privilege.  Thus, Montgomery County’s lottery for MPDU purchasers has 
resulted in greater opportunities than the unregulated system in New Jersey, 
which has delivered most of the suburban affordable units to Whites who 
were already living in the suburbs. 
Roisman also notes that, although economic remedies are an imprecise 
tool to address racial equity, remedies that focus on very low-income 
households, such as Montgomery County directing forty percent of 
MPDUs to the public housing authority, are more likely than other 
economic remedies to help people of color.321
 314. Id. at 84-85 (describing the Massachusetts Comprehensive Plan in particular). 
 315. Id. at 72. 
 316. Id. at 77-78. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. at 77-79. 
 319. Id. at 107 (“One of the reasons for Montgomery County’s relative success is the 
requirement that 40% of the MPDU units be offered to the local public housing authority.”). 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at 107-08. 
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IV. DISPERSAL OF SUBSIDIZED HOUSING 
Because subsidized housing specifically addresses the housing needs of 
certain low-income urban residents, it is important that the units be located 
throughout a metropolitan region.  Policies to increase the number and 
proportion of units available in a region’s suburbs help connect people of 
limited means with opportunities dispersed throughout an urban region. 
A successful illustration is the Twin Cities metropolitan region, which 
adopted progressive policies in the 1970s that quadrupled the proportion of 
the region’s subsidized housing located in the suburbs, and increased over 
seven-fold the number of subsidized housing units in the suburbs in less 
than a decade.322  Between July 1971 and December 1979, the Twin Cities 
suburbs’ share of the region’s subsidized housing stock jumped from ten 
percent to thirty-nine percent.323  The number of subsidized housing units 
in the suburbs increased from 1,878 to 14,712.324
A. The Twin Cities’ Progressive Siting Policies during the 1970s 
The twin cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul are part of a seven-county 
metropolitan region that has an appointed governing body, the 
Metropolitan Council.325  Among its responsibilities are comprehensive 
infrastructure and land use planning for the region; planning, construction 
and management of major metropolitan sewer infrastructure; and planning 
and operating a seven-county metropolitan transit system.326  The 
Minnesota Legislature, through The Metropolitan Land Planning Act of 
1976,327 empowered the Council to serve as a housing authority,328 and to 
operate federally-assisted housing programs in any suburban community 
requesting such assistance.329
 322. METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING ACTIVITY IN THE TWIN CITIES 
METROPOLITAN AREA 6 (1980) (on file with author) [hereinafter METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING]. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. See Carrie Daniel, Note, Land Use Planning—The Twin Cities Metropolitan 
Council: Novel Initiative, Futile Effort, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1941, 1950, 1958 (2001).  
Created by the Minnesota State Legislature in 1967, the Metropolitan Council’s “main 
purpose is to set regional policies as directed by the legislature and then to mandate that 
other organizations implement the policies.”  Id. at 1950-51. 
 326. See id. at 1951; see also Metropolitan Council, About the Metropolitan Council, 
http://metrocouncil.org/about/about.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2006). 
 327. MINN. STAT. § 473.851-.871 (2005). 
 328. See, e.g., Daniel, supra note 325, at 1952-53 (describing the Metropolitan Council’s 
land planning role). 
 329. See, e.g., METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 33 
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A number of factors, including the availability of federal monies for 
subsidized housing construction and conversion,330 contributed to the 
dramatic increase in the number and proportion of subsidized housing units 
in the Twin Cities suburbs during the 1970s.  Yet, the proactive housing 
policies adopted by the Metropolitan Council in 1971331 made it possible 
for the Twin Cities region to leverage effectively those federal funds when 
they became available beginning in 1974.  The Metropolitan Council’s 
policies, which were part of an effort to expand the stock of subsidized 
housing in the suburbs, contributed to a substantial increase in the number 
and share of units available in the suburbs between 1971 and 1974.332
Under Policy 13 (now Policy 39), the Metropolitan Council used its A-
95 authority to review applications for federal grants and implement a 
housing policy encouraging subsidized housing development in the 
suburbs.333  When reviewing local governments’ applications for federal 
funds, the Council recommended priority in funding based on how well a 
local jurisdiction had previously done in providing low- and moderate-
income housing opportunities.334
The other 1971 Council policy that hastened suburbanization of 
affordable housing was a regional subsidized housing allocation plan that 
gave priority in federal housing funds to cities that had already had 
provided low- and moderate-income housing opportunities.335  This 
allocation plan and the Council’s Policy 13 deserve most, if not all, of the 
credit for progress toward the suburbanization of low- and moderate-
income housing in the Twin Cities from 1971 until the advent of Section 8 
(describing Section 8, the federal government’s program for “assisting lower-income 
families to secure decent, safe and sanitary housing”). 
 330. Id. 
 331. See infra notes 333-337 and accompanying text (describing the policies adopted by 
the Metropolitan Council). 
 332. See METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 6 (noting an 
increase of 2,721 units from 1,878 to 4,599, which represented an eight percent jump in the 
share of subsidized housing units located in the suburbs). 
 333. BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE HOUSING 
OPPORTUNITY PLAN (AHOP) PROGRAM, FINAL REPORT, VOLUME TWO: CASE STUDY 
NARRATIVES III-2, III-3 (1979) (on file with author) [hereinafter BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., 
VOLUME TWO]; METRO. COUNCIL, AN OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL HOUSING POLICY AND 
IMPLEMENTATION: 1967-2002 1 (2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter METRO. COUNCIL, 
AN OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL HOUSING POLICY].  The term “A-95 authority” comes from the 
authority granted by the Office of Management and Budget in its Circular A-95.  METRO. 
COUNCIL, AN OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL HOUSING POLICY, supra, at 1. 
 334. METRO. COUNCIL, AN OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL HOUSING POLICY, supra note 333, at 
1. 
 335. See id. at 2; see also BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., VOLUME TWO, supra note 333, at 
III-3. 
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in 1974.336  During those three years, forty-one percent of new subsidized 
housing was located in the suburbs, and the cumulative suburban share of 
the region’s subsidized housing increased from ten to eighteen percent.337
In the wake of a 1973 federal moratorium on public housing 
construction,338 virtually all of the new subsidized housing units from 1973 
through 1979 were funded through the Section 8 program.339  Section 8, 
established by the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act, 
facilitated the transfer of subsidized housing to the suburbs by providing 
renters with the expanded residential choice and mobility of rent 
certificates and vouchers.340  It also funded small developments and mixed-
income developments that would better fit into the suburban landscape than 
did large housing projects.  Under the existing Section 8 program, eligible 
families received certificates or vouchers for rent subsidies in existing 
rental units.341  Under the Section 8 New Construction program (which was 
repealed by the Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983), private 
owners received Section 8 funding to build and own new rental units.342
The Twin Cities regions’ experienced a net gain of 12,255 subsidized 
housing units between 1974 to 1979, due almost entirely to Section 8 
units.343  Fifty-four percent were new construction, and forty-six percent 
were existing units subsidized through Section 8 certificates and 
vouchers.344  From 1974 to 1979, the Twin Cities metropolitan area gained 
7,300 Section 8 New Construction units and 6,334 Section 8 Existing units, 
for a total of 13,634 new Section 8 units.345
During 1975 and 1976, with the Section 8 programs in place, the 
suburbanization of Twin Cities subsidized housing accelerated.  Over these 
two years, sixty-two percent of new subsidized housing activity was in the 
suburbs; the suburbs’ share of the region’s subsidized housing jumped ten 
 336. See infra notes 339-342 for a description of the Section 8 program. 
 337. BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., VOLUME TWO, supra note 333, at III-15 to III-16. 
 338. Charles J. Orlebeke, The Evolution of Low-Income Housing Policy, 1949 to 1999, 11 
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 489, 490 (2000) (noting that in January 1973, President Nixon 
“abruptly imposed a moratorium on all new subsidy commitments”). 
 339. METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 4 tbl.2. 
 340. Id. at 33. 
 341. Id. (noting that eligible families pay no more than twenty-five percent of their 
income toward rent—a housing authority pays the difference); Janet L. Pershing, METRO. 
COUNCIL, CHANGES IN THE SUBSIDIZED HOUSING MARKET IN THE TWIN CITIES 
METROPOLITAN AREA 1980-1989 8 (1990) (describing the use of certificates and vouchers in 
the Twin Cities area). 
 342. METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 33. 
 343. Id. at 6 tbl.4. 
 344. Id. at 14. 
 345. Id. at 3 tbl.1, 14. 
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percentage points to twenty-eight percent.346  During the 1970s, the annual 
distribution of new subsidized units to the suburbs increased from thirty-six 
percent in 1971 to sixty-nine percent in 1979, with a high of seventy-three 
percent in 1977.347
The Council’s progressive policies also contributed to the region’s 
success in the late 1970s.  In 1976, HUD initiated the Areawide Housing 
Opportunity Plan (AHOP) to recognize and build upon the fair-share 
housing plans implemented by several area-wide planning agencies around 
the country.348  The Metropolitan Council was one of the several visionary 
agencies that already had a regional fair-share plan in place.349  As a result, 
the Twin Cities was one of the first regions to get HUD approval of its 
AHOP, and therefore to receive additional HUD funding. 
The AHOP program provided incentives for fair-share development 
through bonus Section 8 funding.350  In the first few years of the AHOP 
program, the Metropolitan Council received more than $7 million in 
Section 8 bonus funding, all of which the Council distributed in the 
suburbs.351  The program accelerated subsidized housing development in 
the suburbs.  In 1977, the Twin Cities suburbs got seventy-three percent of 
the region’s new subsidized housing, and the suburbs’ cumulative share of 
the subsidized housing increased from twenty-eight to thirty-four 
percent.352  In 1978 and 1979, the suburban share of new subsidized 
housing was sixty and sixty-nine percent, respectively, increasing the 
suburbs’ cumulative share to thirty-nine percent by 1979.353
B. Results of the Area-Wide Housing Opportunity Plan 
Even among the most progressive metropolitan regions, the Twin Cities 
stands out for its success in shifting subsidized housing from central cities 
to suburbs.  This conclusion is based in part on a 1979 report in which 
Berkeley Policy Associates attributes the Twin Cities’ success in 
implementing the AHOP program in part to the Metropolitan Council’s 
leadership in developing and enforcing its regional housing allocation 
 346. Id. at 6 tbl.3; BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., VOLUME TWO, supra note 333, at III-15 to 
III-16. 
 347. METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 6 tbl.3. 
 348. BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., VOLUME TWO, supra note 333, at v. 
 349. Id. at III-2 to III-3. 
 350. Id. at III-20, III-31. 
 351. Id. at III-14, III-20. 
 352. METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 6 tbls.3 & 4. 
 353. Id. 
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plan.354  Other factors include the region’s progressive tradition, its small 
population of people of color, and local market conditions that made 
subsidized housing attractive to developers.355
The Berkeley report analyzes the success of the AHOP program in the 
first five regions to qualify for AHOP bonus funding in the first two years 
of the program.356  The Berkeley report examines the following regions: the 
Twin Cities, Los Angeles, Puget Sound (Seattle), Miami Valley (Dayton), 
and Washington, D.C. (which includes Alexandria, four Virginia counties, 
and two Maryland counties).357  The data for the Los Angeles region are 
not tabulated in a way that allows meaningful comparison to the Twin 
Cities numbers, but comparisons with the other regions are possible. 
Between January 1975 to February 1979, the Puget Sound suburbs’ 
share of the region’s subsidized housing increased four percentage points, 
to twenty-five percent.358  In the Twin Cities, the suburban share of 
subsidized housing increased nineteen percentage points, to thirty-seven 
percent, during approximately the same period (July 1974 through 
December 1978).359  The Puget Sound suburbs added 3,026 new units,360 
contrasted with 8,160 in the Twin Cities.361  In the Washington, D.C. 
region, the suburban share of the region’s subsidized housing increased 
eight percentage points, to forty-eight percent, between October 1971 and 
April 1979.362  During the comparable period (July 1971 through 
December 1978), the suburbs’ share in the Twin Cities increased twenty-
seven percentage points, to thirty-seven percent.363  The Washington, D.C. 
region added 8,508 new subsidized units in the suburbs,364 contrasted with 
10,881 in the Twin Cities suburbs.365
In the Miami Valley region, the suburban share of the region’s 
subsidized housing increased eleven percentage points, to thirty-seven 
percent between 1975 and 1979.366  During the same period, the suburban 
share in the Twin Cities also increased eleven percentage points, to thirty-
 354. BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., VOLUME TWO, supra note 333, at III-1, III-20. 
 355. Id. 
 356. See generally id. 
 357. Id. at v. 
 358. Id. at I-15 tbl.6. 
 359. METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 6 tbl.4. 
 360. BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., VOLUME TWO, supra note 333, at I-15 tbl.6. 
 361. METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 6 tbl.4. 
 362. BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., VOLUME TWO, supra note 333, at II-26 tbl.6. 
 363. METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 6 tbl.4. 
 364. BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., VOLUME TWO, supra note 333, at II-26 tbl.6. 
 365. METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 6 tbl.4. 
 366. BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., VOLUME TWO, supra note 333, at IV-23. 
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nine percent.367  The number of new suburban units reported in the Miami 
Valley region was much lower than the number in the Twin Cities,368 but 
this comparison is not helpful.  Not only did the Miami Valley region have 
less than half the population of the Twin Cities, but the report includes 
Section 8 Existing units in the total for the Twin Cities, but not for Miami 
Valley.369
As the Twin Cities example illustrates, progressive policies at the 
regional scale can increase both the number and suburban share of 
affordable housing units by focusing their development in suburban 
locations.  Such policies, when enacted at a regional scale, can position a 
metropolitan region to leverage additional resources for expanding the 
stock of housing for its residents, better connecting them with opportunities 
throughout the region.  In the context of contemporary programs, this can 
be done by siting units developed under the Low Income Housing Tax 
Credit370 in locations away from areas of concentrated poverty and racial 
segregation. 
V. POSITIVE INTEGRATION MEASURES 
In many metropolitan areas, residential racial segregation is deeply 
entrenched.  Even when people of color relocate from central cities to 
suburbs, the same White flight that isolated central city residents is often 
replicated in the suburbs.  When the population of color in a suburb, 
typically an older, inner-ring suburb, reaches a “tipping point,” White flight 
quickly can resegregate the area as the White population plummets.  
Proactive integrative measures are necessary to accomplish desegregation, 
as well as to prevent resegregation. 
Recognizing the value of neighborhood stability, and the importance of 
racial integration, some communities have taken proactive steps to promote 
and preserve diversity.  Two successful examples are discussed next. 
A. Shaker Heights, Ohio 
Shaker Heights is a suburb on the southeast border of Cleveland.  Since 
the 1960s, it has made extraordinary efforts to address racial segregation in 
its community, and to promote integration of its neighborhoods and its 
schools.  One commentator observed in the early 1990s that, “Shaker 
 367. METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 6 tbl.4. 
 368. BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., VOLUME TWO, supra note 333, at IV-23 tbl.10. 
 369. Id. 
 370. 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2005); see also Orfield, Racial Segregation and Community 
Revitalization, supra note 163. 
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Heights is one of the few examples of sustained suburban racial integration 
in the United States.”371
According to a report by the Institute on Race and Poverty, 
Shaker Heights officials have taken a systemic approach to the integration 
of their community, recognizing, for example, that housing patterns and 
school segregation are interrelated and should be addressed together. The 
school board and the school system administration have long been 
involved in the city’s efforts to integrate its neighborhoods.372
In 1964, the mayor, the city council, and the board of education created 
the Shaker Citizens’ Advisory Commission, to address community issues 
like housing segregation.373  That same year, the Commission banned “the 
display of for-sale signs on front lawns to stave off the ‘blockbusting’ that 
had contributed to resegregation elsewhere.”374  According to the 
aforementioned Institute on Race and Poverty report, “the board of 
education also funded and sent representatives to the governing board of 
the Shaker Housing Office . . . to promote housing integration.”375  
Moreover, in 1968, the school board employed a community worker “to 
recruit White residents to buy and rent homes in the Moreland elementary 
school district, which was on the way to becoming an all-Black 
neighborhood.”376
In 1985, the city government and the school system also joined together 
to form the Fund for the Future of Shaker Heights, “an innovative incentive 
program encouraging residential integration.”377  The Fund uses private 
donations to “provide[] low-cost mortgage loans of $3000 and $6000 to 
Whites who move into a neighborhood that is more than 50% Black, and to 
Blacks moving to a neighborhood that is more than 90% White.378  
According to Donald L. DeMarco, director of community services for the 
city, “[i]f you look at [the Fund] as a housing program, you say yes, maybe 
this is something that a board of education should not be involved with, 
[but] it actually is an integrative organization more than a housing 
 371. W. DENNIS KEATING, THE SUBURBAN RACIAL DILEMMA: HOUSING AND 
NEIGHBORHOODS 112 (1994). 
 372. SUSAN HARTIGAN ET AL., INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, RACISM AND THE OPPORTUNITY 
DIVIDE ON LONG ISLAND 26 (2002), available at http://www.eraseracismny.org/downloads/ 
reports/IRP_Full_Report_with_Maps.pdf. 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. 
 376.  Id. (citing INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, STUDENT VOICES ACROSS THE SEPECTRUM: 
THE EDUCATIONAL INTEGRATION INITIATIVES PROJECT 78-79 (2000)). 
 377. Id. at 27. 
 378. Id. 
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organization.”379
Having city governments and school systems work together to promote 
integrated communities is one important technique for developing and 
maintaining stably integrated communities. 
B. South Orange – Maplewood, New Jersey 
The Fund for an Open Society (“Open Society”), an organization 
dedicated to producing racially and ethnically integrated communities, 
helps several communities implement policies similar to those employed in 
Shaker Heights.380  Open Society has worked with South Orange and 
Maplewood, New Jersey since 1996 to create an inclusive community.381
“South Orange and Maplewood are two middle-class suburbs which 
share a school district.”382  In the mid-1990s, a drop in property values, 
combined with increased racial diversity in the local housing market, led 
some community leaders to consider that White homebuyers avoided South 
Orange and Maplewood in the fear that the communities would 
resegregate.383  These community leaders decided to take “a race-conscious 
approach to community-building.”384  With help from Open Society, these 
leaders undertook “a comprehensive, multi-pronged intentional integration 
initiative” with two central objectives: (i) “[b]alance the demand for 
housing among whites and people of color;” and (ii) “[b]alance the 
participation of people of color and whites in the power structure and civic 
life of the community.”385
With funding from the two municipal governments, community leaders 
formed a nonprofit organization, the South Orange/Maplewood 
Community Coalition on Race (the “Coalition”), “to implement the 
 379. Id. (citing Peter Schmidt, Courts, School Boards Testing Strategies To Integrate 
Neighborhoods, Schools, EDUC. WK., Feb. 26, 1992). 
 380. See FUND FOR AN OPEN SOC’Y, RACIAL AND ETHNIC INTEGRATION: BUILDING EQUITY 
AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL 2 (2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter FUND FOR AN OPEN 
SOC’Y, RACIAL AND ETHNIC INTEGRATION] (describing Open Society as “the nation’s only 
organization whose mission is to promote racially and ethnically integrated communities”); 
Fund for an Open Society, How We Work, http://www.opensoc.org/aboutus/work.html (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2006) (describing the Open Society’s desire to create a “unitary housing 
market, where people of more than one race are competing together for available housing”). 
 381. See, e.g., Fund for an Open Society, Demonstrable Results: A Case Study, 
http://www.opensoc.org/aboutus/work2.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). 
 382. See FUND FOR AN OPEN SOC’Y, RACIAL AND ETHNIC INTEGRATION, supra note 380, at 
2. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. 
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intentional integration program.”386  The Coalition markets the community 
to “people who were underrepresented in the housing market, which in this 
case was whites.387  The Coalition ran advertisements in local newspapers 
“positioning South Orange and Maplewood as attractive communities for 
families seeking a suburban lifestyle and strong public schools, but wishing 
to live in a cosmopolitan neighborhood.”388  The Coalition also offers 
potential homebuyers tours designed “to subvert potential steering by real 
estate agents.”389  Moreover, the Coalition communicates with real estate 
agents to make them “aware of all the positive aspects of the 
communities.”390  Furthermore, the Coalition created a fair housing 
organization (the Morris, Union, Sussex, and Essex Fair Housing Council) 
that conducts paired testing391 “to identify whether discrimination and 
steering exist in the housing market.”392
The Coalition also offers financial incentives to homebuyers 
participating in the integration initiative: “Whites and people of color . . . 
[who] purchase[d] homes in parts of the community where their race is 
under-represented . . . [could obtain] a second mortgage of $10,000 at a 
significantly reduced interest rate.”393
In the broader community, the Coalition pursues an “integration culture” 
by “encouraging residents’ comfort level with talking openly about race, by 
building inter-racial trust and relationships, and by working to address 
potential problems.”394  It has sponsored a variety of cultural, social and 
educational events.395
Since its inception in 1996, the Coalition has made significant progress 
toward “creating and sustaining intentional integration.”396  Positive results 
include: 
? South Orange and Maplewood housing values are “increasing at 
a proportionately higher rate” than those of surrounding 
segregated suburbs;397 
? Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data “shows that whites and 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. at 3. 
 388. Id. 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. 
 391. See infra notes 424-427 and accompanying text for a description of paired testing. 
 392. FUND FOR AN OPEN SOC’Y, RACIAL AND ETHNIC INTEGRATION, supra note 380, at 3. 
 393. Id. 
 394. Id. 
 395. Id. at 3-4. 
 396. Id. at 4. 
 397. Id. 
FORDHAMPP2 5/1/2006  2:15:50 PM 
2006] REDUCING CONCENTRATED POVERTY 151 
 
people of color are now buying homes in every census tract in 
the community”;398 
? Money Magazine named Maplewood “one of the Top Ten 
communities in the nation, specifically citing its diversity”;399 
and 
? Increased representation by people of color in both town 
councils.400 
Thus, as in Shaker Heights, coordinated pro-integration efforts have 
benefited Maplewood and South Orange.  Yet, these types of coordinated 
pro-integration measures are, unfortunately, rare.  The absence of regional-
scale policy approaches in most metropolitan areas impedes pro-integration 
efforts. 
Recognizing the value and successes of these integration efforts, W. 
Dennis Keating nevertheless observes that, for significant progress to be 
made, it is necessary to have “metropolitan strategies that would apply to 
all suburbs, not just those few that voluntarily have tried to deal with racial 
issues in housing.”401  Because dynamics within cities in a metropolitan 
region play out at the regional scale, Keating concludes that “[t]he lack of a 
viable metropolitan fair housing strategy or, in the alternative, countywide 
incentives for pro-integrative policies has resulted in piecemeal progress at 
best.”402
C. Fostering Stable Racial-Ethnic Diversity 
The two case studies (Shaker Heights, Ohio and South Orange and 
Maplewood, New Jersey)403 illustrate the value of proactive, multifaceted 
efforts to promote stable integration.  Researchers have observed that 
communities characterized by “self-conscious diversity” are more stable 
than communities that do not actively work to develop and sustain 
diversity.404  For example, Philip Nyden, Michael Maly, and John Lukehart 
reached that conclusion after examining the characteristics of fourteen 
stable racially and ethnically diverse urban communities.405  Based on their 
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. 
 400. Id. 
 401. KEATING, supra note 371, at 72. 
 402. Id. 
 403. See supra Parts V.A and V.B respectively. 
 404. Philip Nyden et al., The Emergence of Stable Racially and Ethnically Diverse 
Communities: A Case Study of Nine U.S. Cities, 8 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 491, 512-13 
(1997). 
 405. Id. at 497. 
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research, Nyden, Maly, and Lukehart recommended the following policies 
and community-based strategies to encourage and maintain stably 
integrated communities: 
? Expect government leaders and agencies proactively to promote 
diverse neighborhoods.406 
? Encourage consciousness on the part of urban planners “to 
examine the consequences of their actions . . . that may either 
destabilize existing neighborhoods or thwart the development of 
new diverse neighborhoods.”407 
? Maintain and strengthen fair housing laws.408 
? Encourage public and private funding and programs that 
promote mixed-income, racially diverse communities.409 
? Develop and disseminate information on strategies to strengthen 
community-based organizations.410 
? Establish citywide and regional networks of diverse community 
organizations.411 
? Develop “[l]eadership training institutes for residents of diverse 
communities.”412 
? Maintain quality schools and community safety programs in 
diverse neighborhoods. 
? Encourage the creation of programs that support mixed-income 
development. 
? Encourage local chambers of commerce and other business 
associations to view diverse communities “as potentially strong 
markets.”413 
? Encourage the media to tell “the positive stories of diverse 
community successes.”414 
? Encourage ““[l]ocal community organizations, existing 
institutions, and local governments . . . to be receptive to new 
groups and be willing to work with them on common 
community issues.”415 
 406. Id. at 523. 
 407. Id. 
 408. Id. 
 409. Id. 
 410. Id. 
 411. Id. at 524. 
 412. Id. 
 413. Id. at 525. 
 414. Id. 
 415. Id. 
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? Develop programs to create jobs and improve access to jobs in 
surrounding communities.416 
? Conduct public discussions about whether “maintaining ethnic- 
and race-based political constituencies undermines efforts to 
develop and sustain diverse communities.”417 
Legislation should include provisions supporting positive integration 
measures like those that have contributed to maintaining stable racially 
integrated communities in places like Shaker Heights, Ohio, and South 
Orange and Maplewood, New Jersey.  These measures must recognize that 
housing patterns and school integration are interrelated and thus require 
joint efforts by local government and school officials.  Positive integration 
measures also can include funding and other support for policies such as 
the creation of local committees or agencies dedicated to residential 
integration, and the provision of low-interest mortgage loans to 
homebuyers in areas where the homebuyers’ race is under-represented.  
Government funding as well as private foundation funding should be 
tapped to support these initiatives. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Land use and housing policies should be marshaled to reduce residential 
racial segregation and concentrated poverty.  Two recommendations are 
foundational for policy development.  The first is to ensure that policies 
address an effective geographic scale: policies must apply to a statewide or, 
at least, regional area.  If adopted only in isolated municipalities or 
counties, land-use policies can increase urban sprawl and the resulting 
segregation by encouraging leapfrog development.  Developers and home 
buyers unwilling to abide by land use or housing policies in one place will 
take their development elsewhere.418
The second foundational recommendation is to adopt a coordinated 
policy approach.  Oregon’s comprehensive land use legislation is a solid 
starting point for crafting a system of laws to facilitate residential 
integration by providing access to affordable housing throughout a metro 
region.  To that suite of policies can be added inclusionary housing 
approaches, effectively sited subsidized housing, and positive integration 
measures. 
This Article has focused on policies to remedy structural discrimination 
that restricts access to affordable housing and to opportunities in vibrant 
 416. Id. 
 417. Id. 
 418. Kushner, supra note 12, at 53. 
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and developing portions of metro areas.  The first eight recommendations 
that follow are strategies for addressing structural discrimination.  To 
ensure access to opportunity and foster integration, however, we also must 
confront overt housing discrimination, which is the focus of the concluding 
recommendation. 
1.  Prohibit Exclusionary Zoning 
The logical first step toward providing affordable housing throughout a 
region is to eliminate laws and policies that prohibit its development.  The 
most effective approach is that taken by Oregon to standardize local 
governments’ zoning authority by enacting statewide criteria to which all 
local zoning provisions must adhere.  An aggressive prohibition on 
exclusionary zoning should require local planning units to project their 
affordable housing needs and to zone in a manner that permits development 
of housing types to meet those needs.  No jurisdiction should be permitted 
blanket prohibitions on attached housing, multifamily housing, 
manufactured homes, or government-assisted housing. 
A more passive approach, seen in Massachusetts, is to streamline the 
permit process for affordable housing developments and to provide state 
subsidy programs to promote mixed-income development.  If a legislature 
chooses a passive approach for discouraging exclusionary zoning, it must 
modify the Massachusetts model by distinguishing between family housing 
and housing for the elderly.  Legislation must provide that all, or at least a 
substantial portion, of the new housing created be available to families with 
children. 
2.  Require Comprehensive Planning and Provide for Dedicated 
Enforcement 
Oregon’s legislation is the best example of a coordinated system of land 
use regulation.  It manages growth and ensures that localities attend to the 
anticipated housing needs of all residents, including those needing 
affordable housing.  One is the comprehensive planning requirement, 
which requires each jurisdiction to predict and provide for the range of 
housing needs.  The other is the enforcement system, which includes 
review entities dedicated to reviewing only land use issues, and prompt 
review procedures. 
3.  Use Urban Growth Boundaries to Reduce Sprawl and  Promote 
Infill 
UGBs that contain sprawl can alleviate the spatial isolation of central 
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city residents from jobs and other opportunities in outlying suburbs.  UGBs 
should be part of a coordinated land use system at a regional scale to avoid 
“leapfrogging” and extreme impacts on the land and housing markets.  In 
addition, policies to facilitate development and ensure adequate housing 
supplies should be part of any UGB policy.  These include expedited 
review of proposed developments that include affordable housing, density 
bonuses, higher-density zoning, and periodic review of the supply of land 
available for development. 
4.  Adopt Proactive Policies to Prevent Displacement 
Policies like UGBs that promote infill development must be 
accompanied by policies to prevent such development from displacing low-
income persons and residents of color.  Besides prohibiting exclusionary 
zoning, displacement-mitigating strategies should include “fair share” 
inclusionary housing policies. These can require any infill development to 
include affordable housing units, and can provide for subsidies, such as 
housing trust funds, to help finance affordable housing construction.419
5.  Link Affordable Housing Development with Public Transportation 
If affordable housing is developed at sites where public transit is 
available, residents without personal vehicles will have greater access to 
employment and other opportunities.  James Kushner has proposed the 
following transit-related and equity-oriented initiatives that can help guide 
policy development: 
1. Make the infrastructure investment to create efficient, high-
speed inter-city trains and convenient local transit in urban 
areas. 
2. Increase funding for urban transit and “Transit-oriented 
development” (TOD): mixed-use, high-density walkable 
pedestrian neighborhoods around stops. 
3. Condition transit subsidies on land use conversion to TOD 
around stations and stops. 
4. Condition transit funding on cities establishing a transit corridor 
plan with identified routes implemented through the use of 
TODs around stops. 
5. Condition transit funding on the establishment of “urban growth 
boundaries” that accommodate reasonably anticipated regional 
growth. 
 419. Id. at 68. 
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6. Establish incentives for in-fill development.  Empowerment and 
enterprise zones should be available to encourage TOD 
development along transit corridors in lower-income 
communities in need of revitalization. 
7. Establish a tax credit program offering incentives for urban infill 
development. 
8. Require inclusion of a minimum percentage of low-income 
housing tax-credit financed units and offer reservation priority 
for developers of TODs. 
9. Establish a housing program generating a mixture of incomes 
linked by transportation and employment access, targeting infill 
development along transit corridors. 
10. Make necessary modifications to the federal Community 
Development Block Grant Program to authorize the use of block 
grant funds for development of TODs in low-income 
communities. 
11. Condition federal highway and transit funding on the states’ 
requiring a transit corridor plan element in local comprehensive 
plans that designate TOD development at transit stops. 
12. Modify state redevelopment laws to allow their use as an 
alternative to traditional blight determination in executing infill 
TOD plans, albeit with stringent restrictions favoring 
rehabilitation and reuse over clearance or demolition. 
13. Eliminate sprawl-generating subsidies such as funds for 
suburban highway and road construction or the provision of 
subsidized water, or sewer facilities and service, on the urban 
fringe.  Structure compensating subsidies that favor urban infill 
and TOD development. 
14. Plan for the use of parks and green space throughout the 
community to make attractive pedestrian corridors. 
15. Establish regional government authority to plan transit and 
corridor development rather than allowing traditional local 
autonomy. 
16. Establish a regional tax-sharing scheme that will encourage 
affordable housing inclusion and discourage destructive sales 
tax competition.420 
 420. Id. at 58-60. 
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6.  Adopt Inclusionary Housing Policies 
Policies that encourage or, better yet, require each jurisdiction to provide 
its “fair share” of affordable housing can help reduced segregation and 
concentrated poverty if designed to include sufficient low-income housing 
and to ensure a race-conscious fair share for non-White residents.  
Subsidies can assist production of very low-income units.  Lotteries and 
assignment of a substantial share of the units to public housing authorities 
can help ensure that people of color have access to these housing 
opportunities. 
To be effective, inclusionary housing policies should apply to 
developments as small as ten units, or there should be provisions for 
developers to “buy-out” the requirement, with the funds going to support 
low-income housing development.  If most units are maintained as rentals, 
and if the units are not permitted to revert to market rates after a short 
period, these policies should better serve poor and non-White residents 
within a metro region. 
7.  Promote Positive Integration Measures 
Legislation should include provisions supporting positive integration 
measures like those that have contributed to maintaining stable racially 
integrated communities in places like Shaker Heights, Ohio, and South 
Orange and Maplewood, New Jersey.  Among the important features of 
these measures is recognition that housing patterns and school integration 
are interrelated, leading to joint efforts by local government and school 
officials to work together to preserve and create diverse communities.  
Positive integration measures also can include funding and other support 
for policies such as the creation of local committees or agencies dedicated 
to residential integration, and the provision of low-interest mortgage loans 
to purchasers of homes in areas where their race is under-represented.  
Government funding as well as private foundation funding should be 
tapped to support these initiatives. 
Based on their empirical research of stable diverse communities, Nyden, 
Maly, and Lukehart recommended a suite of policies and community-based 
strategies to encourage and maintain stably integrated communities.421  
These pro-integration measures can be added to the other approaches that 
this article recommends. 
 421. See supra notes 406-417 and accompanying text (describing the various policies that 
the authors recommend). 
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8.  Effectively Site Subsidized Housing 
Strategies for siting subsidized housing should disperse units throughout 
a metro region rather than concentrate them.  In most regions, that means 
increasing the number and proportion of units available in suburban 
locations, especially newer, fast-growing suburbs.  Any policies should 
provide that housing developed under the Low Income Housing Tax 
Credit422 be dispersed throughout a metro region and not be sited either in 
areas of concentrated poverty or areas that are racially segregated or 
resegregating. 
9.  Enforce and Strengthen Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in 
Housing Markets 
Unlike the preceding recommendations, this one addresses overt 
discrimination.  While not the topic of this article, overt discrimination in 
housing remains a barrier to accessing opportunity.  While it may be 
lessening, discrimination against Black and Hispanic renters and 
homebuyers persists in major metropolitan areas.423  Thus, rigorous 
enforcement of existing federal, state, and local laws prohibiting 
discrimination in the housing market is essential, and these laws must be 
strengthened where necessary. 
One can use paired testing to detect discrimination in the housing 
market.424  Paired testing “control[s] for differences between white and 
minority homeseekers, and directly measure[s] patterns of adverse 
treatment based on a homeseeker’s race or ethnicity.”425  Pairs of testers—
one White and one Black or Hispanic—are provided with identical 
credentials and trained to present themselves to real estate agents or 
landlords, posing as potential renters or homebuyers.426  Although the 
mortgage lending process is more complex, making paired testing more 
difficult, a recent HUD publication reports that paired testing also can be an 
effective tool for research and enforcement of anti-discrimination laws in 
mortgage lending.427  To reduce overt discrimination, state and local 
 422. 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2005); see also Orfield, Racial Segregation and Community 
Revitalization, supra note 163. 
 423. TURNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 8-1 to 8-5; YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, 
OPPORTUNITIES LOST, supra note 14, at 49. 
 424. TURNER ET AL., supra note 14, at i. 
 425. Id. 
 426. Id. 
 427. OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., ALL 
OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL: A PAIRED TESTING STUDY OF MORTGAGE LENDING 
INSTITUTIONS ii (2002), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/PDF/aotbe.pdf. 
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governments must be pushed to fund ongoing paired testing, either by 
government agencies or by nonprofit fair housing organizations. 
CONCLUSION 
Existing examples of housing and land use policies that promote a 
racially and economically integrated society are valuable.  While imperfect, 
they are heartening and instructive illustrations.  By adopting and refining 
the best of the policies and practices already in use, the harmful effects of 
sprawl and concentrated poverty on non-White and poor residents can be 
reduced. 
The racial segregation and concentrated poverty resulting from structural 
barriers such as sprawl and exclusionary zoning operate to isolate non-
White and poor residents far from places of opportunity.  Each day they 
engrave inequality into the landscapes of our metropolitan regions.  In 
response, communities can promote development that removes barriers to 
opportunity by making affordable housing available throughout a 
metropolitan region.  One way to ensure that access to opportunity is 
available in a metropolitan region, irrespective of race or ethnicity, is to 
adopt proactive housing and land use policies. 
 
